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Multinational enterprises and the global investment regime:  
Toward balancing rights and responsibilities 
 
by 
Karl P. Sauvant* 
 
1. Setting the scene: The growth of foreign direct investment and of the activities of 
multinational enterprises  
 
The activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) – more than 80,000 firms 
headquartered in one country and controlling assets in another country – have grown 
substantially over the past three decades.1 While there are no systematic data on non-
equity forms of such activities (such as management contracts, licensing and franchising 
agreements), data do exist on the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. 
investments of 10 percent or more in an enterprise abroad: These flows have risen from 
an annual average of US$ 50 billion during 1981-1985 to US$ 2.1 trillion in 2007. Flows 
declined in 2008 and 2009 by some 50 percent, to approximately US$1.1 trillion (table 
1), as a result of the financial crisis and recession (and stayed at the same level in 2010). 
But as long as FDI flows remain positive, the stock of such investment continues to grow, 
at least in principle. By the end of 2009, this stock had reached US$ 19 trillion, 
generating sales by foreign affiliates estimated to be worth some US$ 29 trillion (table 1); 
this sales value was about twice the value of world exports the same year (US$ 16 
trillion). In other words, FDI has become more important than trade in terms of delivering 
goods and services to foreign markets. In addition, some one-third of world trade consists 
of intra-firm trade, i.e. trade among the various units (foreign affiliates, domestic plants, 
headquarters) that make up the increasingly integrated international production systems 
of individual MNEs. Moreover, it is within these corporate systems that the bulk of the 
world’s commercial research and development is being undertaken and technology and 
skills are being transferred, and through which the world market can be accessed. 
Through all these activities, MNEs integrate not only markets but also national 
production systems on a regional or global scale.  
 
                                                 
** The author is Executive Director, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
(www.vcc.columbia.edu ), email address: karlsauant@gmail.com. José E. Alvarez, Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Richard Eglin, Michael Gestrin, Mark Kantor, Theodore M. Moran, Peter Muchlinski, Ucheora 
Onwuamaegbu, Kenneth Vandevelde, and Joerg Weber made very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
Elizabeth Briones, Hamed El-Kady, Tatyana Gershkovich, Boyan Konstantinov, and Kyoko Ogawa 
provided inputs and helped in the finalization of this text. Without Lisa Sachs and Wouter Schmit 
Jongbloed, though, it would not have seen the light of day. To all of them: thank you very much. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
1 The salient features of the activities of MNE are best documented in UNCTAD’s annual World 
Investment Report (see www.unctad.org). The data used here are from this source, unless otherwise 
footnoted. The latest edition is UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon 







Table 1. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1990-2009 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy 
(New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2010), p. 16. 
 
In the past, the world FDI market was dominated by MNEs from developed countries. 
While they remain the primary actors, a noticeable recent development is the growth of 
MNEs from emerging markets.2 At the end of 2009, outward FDI flows undertaken by 
more than 20,000 MNEs headquartered in emerging markets were about US$ 280 billion 
(nearly six times annual average world FDI outflows during 1981-1985), accounting for 
about 25 percent of world FDI outflows; they also controlled nearly US$ 3 trillion of the 
world’s outward FDI stock in 2009. As a result, a number of emerging markets are now 
not only primarily host countries, but are becoming important home countries as well. In 
2009, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) together accounted for about one-third 
of total FDI outflows from emerging markets. 
 
All this makes MNEs the most important private actors in the international economy. It 
also makes them important actors in individual economies, although, on average (2007-
2009), FDI inflows accounted for only 13 percent of gross fixed capital formation 
worldwide. This percentage is similar in developed countries and developing countries, 
although the percentage varies widely among both developed and developing countries. 
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, all countries seek to attract FDI, as the tangible and intangible 
assets associated with FDI -- capital, technology, employment, skills, access to markets, 
etc.—can make an important contribution to national development. They do so 
notwithstanding the governments’ knowledge that FDI can also be associated with a 
range of negative effects, including the crowding out of domestic firms, restrictive 
                                                 
2 “Emerging markets” are all economies of the world, minus those defined by UNCTAD as “developed 
countries”; see UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, op. cit. For a discussion, see, Karl P. Sauvant and 
Geraldine McAllister, with Wolfgang A. Maschek, eds., Foreign Direct Investment from Emerging 






business practices, transfer pricing, undesirable environmental effects, and the 
curtailment of competition.3 
 
As discussed below, the evaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI and MNE activities 
can change over time, and has done so. With it, the nature of national policies and 
international agreements – and therefore the regime governing investment and 
multinational enterprises – change as well, depending on how governments perceive their 
interests and pursue their objectives. 
 
2. Interests and objectives  
 
In contrast to the trade area, no multilateral framework governs foreign direct investment 
and the activities of MNEs.  This is not for wont of trying. As early as 1948, the aborted 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization had sought to address investment 
issues.  This effort was resumed in a comprehensive manner only in the late 1970s, and it 
involved the negotiations of a United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations (UN Code) in the context of that Organization’s wider work on FDI and 
MNEs.4 The effort to regulate FDI and the activities of MNEs was resumed on the basis 
of the shared recognition that the cross-border nature of the activities of these firms 
required an international approach to their regulation. The question was, however: What 
would be the purpose of such regulation? 
 
The UN Code negotiations established the two dominant themes – and tensions – that 
have since characterized efforts to establish an international framework for FDI and the 
activities of MNEs, namely (1) the struggle to find the proper balance between the rights 
and responsibilities of host countries on one hand and those of MNEs on the other; and 
(2) the struggle over the legal nature (mandatory vs. voluntary) that any rights and 
responsibilities should take. Governments approach these two issues from the perspective 
of what is most in the interest of their countries, including their own enterprises -- in 
other words, in light of the costs and benefits they expect from FDI and the activities of 
MNEs. These struggles, based on the underlying interests, have determined the 
subsequent evolution of the international investment law and policy regime. 
 
                                                 
3 For a full discussion of the impact of FDI on economic development, see, for example, UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challange of Development (New York and 
Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999); Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development: Launching a 
Second Generation of Policy Research. Avoiding the Mistakes of the First, Re-evaluating Policies for 
Development and Developing Countries (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
forthcoming), Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003); Kevin P. Gallagher and Daniel Chudnovsky, Rethinking Foreign Investment for Sustainable 
Development: Lessons from Latin America (London: Anthem Press, 2009). 
4 For an in-depth review of the activities of the UN in the area of FDI, see Tagi Sagafi-nejad in 
collaboration with John H. Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to 
Global Compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). See also Theodore H. Moran, “The United 
Nations and transnational corporations: a review and a perspective”, Transnational Corporations, vol. 18 





So what are the underlying interests that drive the evolution of the international 
investment regime? 
 
Host countries, as already discussed, seek to attract FDI, especially of the kind that 
furthers their economic development the most (as witnessed by the efforts of countries to 
target specific types of investment), and to maximize the benefits that they can derive 
from such investments. At the same time, they seek to preserve the flexibility they need 
to minimize any negative impact of FDI or the activities of MNEs and to safeguard any 
important non-economic objectives they pursue in their own national interest (including 
essential security interests). As will be discussed below, the concept of “national 
interests” is typically not defined and can include a range of military, political, economic, 
and cultural considerations.  
 
When considering their interests, therefore, host country governments seek (to different 
degrees) to limit their mandatory responsibilities vis-à-vis foreign investors, while 
maintaining a legal right to regulate the entry of MNEs and the behavior of these firms 
once they are established in their territories.  
 
Home countries, for their part, typically seek to protect the foreign assets of their 
outward-investing MNEs and to facilitate the operations of their firms abroad. The 
former involves the establishment of strong and broad protection and dispute-settlement 
standards, anchored not only in national laws but also in international agreements, 
especially with countries whose judicial systems are considered to be fragile, biased 
and/or inefficient. The latter involves the liberalization of entry conditions for MNEs into 
host countries and the reduction of any restrictions on foreign affiliates operating in host 
countries. Home country governments typically do not want to assume direct obligations, 
except with regard to subrogation and the settlement of disputes between treaty partners. 
 
When considering their interests as home countries, therefore, governments seek broad 
mandatory responsibilities for host country governments with respect to the treatment of 
MNEs and their foreign affiliates, while limiting any responsibilities of foreign investors 
or keeping any responsibilities voluntary. 
 
This interest picture is of course not as clear-cut as just presented. For example, during 
the 1970s, when the FDI/MNE problematique reached the international agenda, a number 
of developed countries too were interested, at least to a certain degree, in regulating the 
activities of MNEs, supporting for example guidelines for these enterprises.5 More 
importantly, all countries were (and are) host countries, and more and more are becoming 
home countries as well. In particular, emerging markets, traditionally primarily host 
                                                 
5 Thus, there were extensive hearings in the U.S. on outward FDI and especially concerning the activities of 
ITT in Chile. See US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 
1970–1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973). Also, for example, The Netherlands was 
a co-sponsor of the resolution initiating work by the United Nations on this subject; see ECOSOC Res. 
1721, 53 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (no. 1), U.N. Doc. E/5209 (1972) which called on the United Nations 
Secretary-General to establish a Group of Eminent Persons to study the effects of multinational enterprises 





countries, are increasingly also becoming home countries (as pointed out earlier); hence 
they need to be more sensitive to the concerns of their firms investing abroad. Traditional 
home countries (principally developed countries), for their part, pay more attention to 
their position as host countries; this is helped by the fact that they increasingly have 
become respondents in international investment disputes and, moreover, face various 
types of new investors, especially from emerging markets (including sovereign 
investors). Traditional home countries are further sensitized to their position as host 
countries by various political and economic concerns associated with inward FDI. 
 
As the underlying FDI situation of countries becomes similar, the host/home country 
interests need to be rebalanced. This, in turn, affects how the two dominant themes – and 
tensions – identified earlier are addressed in the international investment law and policy 
regime. How this has been done over time, and the challenges to which this has led, will 
be examined next. 
 
3. The rise of international investment agreements and their orientation 
 
a. The 1960s and 1970s: Focus on the responsibilities of MNEs and the rights of 
governments 
 
The UN Code negotiations – within which these interests and objectives were dealt with 
in prolonged negotiations -- sought to address the rights and responsibilities of host 
countries and MNEs in a comprehensive and balanced manner.6 Developing countries 
approached these negotiations from the perspective that the negative effects of FDI 
outweighed the positive ones; hence they imposed various controls on the activities of 
MNEs within their territories. Mirroring their domestic policy approach, developing 
countries (and the socialist countries) – all of them at that time overwhelmingly host 
countries -- focused therefore in the UN Code negotiations on defining the 
responsibilities of MNEs (and they wanted these responsibilities to be binding) and 
preserving their own rights as regards the treatment of these enterprises; to put it 
differently, host developing countries sought to keep their own responsibilities and the 
rights of MNEs as limited as possible. In line with these objectives, developing countries 
(and the socialist countries) also sought strong and mandatory language on 
intergovernmental cooperation and the implementation of the UN Code, with a view 
toward giving effect to this instrument. 
 
Reflecting that they were the principal home countries of MNEs and that the negotiations 
took place in a North-South context, the developed countries focused especially on the 
responsibilities of host countries to treat foreign firms in line with certain principles; they 
wanted to keep the responsibility of MNEs as general as possible; and they sought weak 
language on international cooperation and implementation. On the question of mandatory 
vs. voluntary, the developed countries put forth a preference for a voluntary instrument, 
                                                 
6 The draft text, as well the other international investment instruments referred to, are contained in 
UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 






primarily because they did not want to impose (even general) mandatory behavioral 
standards on (at that time mostly “their”) MNEs, while (depending on what would 
eventually have been agreed upon) possibly weakening customary international law 
regarding the treatment of foreign investors. 
 
The negotiations of the UN Code, which had begun in 1976, reached their most intensive 
phase in the early 1980s and then slowed down. The objectives of the developed and 
developing countries concerning the dominant themes of the negotiations could not be 
reconciled. While substantial agreement on (typically) fairly general responsibilities of 
MNEs could be reached, host countries resisted the language sought by developed 
countries on the treatment of foreign investors. This made the Code unbalanced in the 
eyes of developed countries. Accordingly, they opposed a mandatory instrument with 
strong international cooperation and implementation provisions.7  
 
This stalemate was resolved when the environment within which the negotiations took 
place changed. In particular, as discussed below, attitudes in host countries toward FDI 
became more welcoming, while developed countries initiated the negotiation of bilateral 
investment treaties for the protection and promotion of foreign investment, i.e., binding 
instruments that focus almost entirely on the responsibility of host countries. The 
negotiations of the UN Code fizzled out in 1992.8  
 
The quest for a comprehensive United Nations Code and other instruments dealing with 
FDI and MNEs itself was the result of heightened awareness about the importance of FDI 
and issues relating to it,9 the post-decolonization political climate of developing countries 
seeking a voice in shaping the international economic system and the rules governing it  
(especially in light of their own overriding priority, development),10 and the new 
assertiveness of developing countries in the wake of OPEC’s success to raise the price of 
oil substantially and hence assert their bargaining power.11 As far as the specific areas of 
FDI and MNE activities were concerned, the cost/benefit calculation of host developing 
countries suggested that the negative effects of FDI and MNE activities out-weighted the 
positive ones and that, therefore, the responsibilities of MNEs needed to be defined and 
                                                 
7 Even if developing countries (and the socialist countries) had been more flexible on the provisions 
regarding treatment, international cooperation and implementation, it is not at all clear whether key 
developed countries would have accepted an instrument with mandatory provisions governing the activities 
of (mostly “their”) MNEs.   
8 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International 
Production (New York: United Nations, 1993). According to this report, “After informal consultations held 
from 21 to 23 July 1992, delegations concluded that, at present, no consensus was possible on the draft 
Code.” Id. at 33. This brought the negotiations on the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations to a formal end. 
9 United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York: United Nations, 1973). 
See also Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational 
Corporations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974). See also the reference to the Hearings in footnote 5. 
10 Which found its expression, among other things, in a spade of nationalizations, especially in natural 
resources. 
11 This mood was captured in the well-known article by C. Fred Bergsten, entitled “One, two, many 





enforced.12 Accordingly, negotiations were initiated on various aspects of the FDI/MNE 
problematique, in various multilateral and regional fora, with a number of them leading 
to the eventual adoption of instruments. 
 
Many of these negotiations were driven by (host) developing countries, supported by the 
socialist countries, and pursued in the United Nations system, and they sought to affirm 
the rights of governments vis-à-vis foreign investors or their desire to impose 
responsibilities on MNEs. Most noteworthy among them were the United Nations 
resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources13 and especially the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States14 and the resolutions related to the establishment 
of a New International Economic Order15 as these instruments reflected most clearly the 
approach of host (developing) countries. Other instruments in this category negotiated in 
a multilateral framework included the ILO Tripartite Declaration;16 codes of conduct on 
                                                 
12 At least in a multilateral context. At the national level, attitudes toward FDI in many countries remained 
much more welcoming than the positions of the governments of these countries in multilateral fora 
suggested. 
13 See e.g., especially Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
of Developing Countries, G.A. res. 3016 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, 12 ILM 226.  
14 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN Doc. A/RES/29/3281(1974). Article 2(2) of the 
Charter states:  
Each State has the right:  
a. To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in 
accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and 
priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment;  
b.   To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national 
jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and 
regulations and conform with its economic and social policies. Transnational corporations 
shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard 
for its sovereign rights, cooperate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in this 
subparagraph; 
c.    To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into 
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall 
be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is 
freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the 
basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of 
means.  
 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted against the votes of Belgium, Denmark, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States; Australia, 
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain abstained. The roll call 
vote is registered at 14 ILM 265 (1975).  
15 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 
(1974), reprinted 13 ILM 715. Article 4 of the Declaration states: “The new international economic order 
should be founded on full respect for the following principles…. Regulation and supervision of the 
activities of transnational corporations by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the 
countries where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty of those 
countries…” The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on May 1, 1974. 
16 International Labour Organization Tripartitie Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 





restrictive business practices,17 breast-milk substitutes,18 consumer protection,19 and the 
transfer of technology;20 and a model convention for double taxation treaties between 
developed and developing countries.21 Decision 24 of the Andean Pact22 reflected the 
same spirit at the sub-regional level. 
 
Developed (home) countries, too, were active at the multilateral level. Even before the 
initiative had shifted to the developing and socialist countries at the beginning of the 
1970s, they had succeeded in the adoption (1965) of a convention that established the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,23 an institution that was 
largely dormant until the number of international investment disputes began to rise 
substantially in the late 1990s. But developed countries were largely defensive, trying to 
limit the initiative of the developing and socialist countries by seeking to keep 
responsibilities of MNEs voluntary. Their only major initiative concerned the proposal 
for an agreement on illicit payments, proposed by the United States; but since neither the 
developing countries nor other developed countries were strongly supportive, this effort 
fizzled out as well.24  
                                                                                                                                                 
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf. The ILO 
Declaration contains also references to (already existing) binding instruments. 
17 UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices, UN doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981). The Set of Principles and Rules was 
adopted by the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices on April 22, 1980 and by the 
General Assembly in resolution 35/63 on December 5, 1980. Subsequently, UNCTAD convened United 
Nations Conferences to Review All Aspects of the Set. These documents are available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf.    
18 World Health Organization, International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (1981). The 
Code was adopted by the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly by resolution WHA34.22 on May 21, 
1981. These documents are available at: http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code_english.pdf. 
19 Guidelines for Consumer Protection, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
39/248 on April 9, 1985.  
20 The Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology was negotiated between 1976 
and 1985. It has not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the draft is 
available at:  http://stdev.unctad.org/compendium/documents/totcode%20.html. 
21 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 
adopted by the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters in 1979.  This model 
specifically addresses the experts’ concerns that the 1963 OECD Model Convention on Income and on 
Capital, which involves drastic reductions in withholding taxes, would not be appropriate for capital 
importing countries (because these have to reduce their withholding taxes and do not benefit from the 
reciprocal reduction in the capital exporting country's withholding tax because their residents do not invest 
much overseas). It was last updated in 2000. The recent trend has been for the UN model to converge 
toward the OECD model. I thank Reuven Avi-Yonah for pointing this out. 
22 “Decision 24: Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, 
and Royalties,” Nov. 30, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977). 
23 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
entered into force on October 14, 1966, available at: 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp. Several years earlier, in 1958, the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) was adopted 
by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration. It entered into force on June 7, 
1959.  
24 See brief history and text of the Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/9%20volume%201.pdf. The draft was put 






At the regional level, however, the developed countries adopted (1976) the OECD 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.25 It consisted of 
four elements, each underpinned by a Decision by the OECD Council on follow-up 
procedures, related to guidelines for multinational enterprises, national treatment, 
conflicting requirements, and international investment incentives and disincentives. 
Although this instrument was adopted within a relatively like-minded group of countries 
(“relatively” because especially Australia and Canada also paid attention to their status as 
host countries), it reflected the tensions identified earlier in the North-South context, as 
well as a trade-off between the treatment of foreign investors and the desire to regulate 
the activities of MNEs, with the guidelines being strictly voluntary, although monitoring 
and review arrangements were made. Since the Declaration was adopted after the NIEO 
resolutions were passed and before the negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct 
began, it prepared the developed countries for those negotiations and signaled that, if they 
would agree to anything at all, it would have to be in the context of a package addressing 
the rights and responsibilities of host countries and MNEs, with the responsibilities of 
MNEs being voluntary.26  
 
b. The mid-1980s until the early 2000s: Focus on the responsibilities of host 
countries and the rights of MNEs 
 
If the objectives of the developing (host) countries drove the international investment- 
agreements making efforts during the 1970s, the initiative shifted to the developed 
countries around the middle of the 1980s. Negotiations on virtually every instrument that 
had not been concluded by then were eventually abandoned, most notably among them 
(as already mentioned) the United Nations Code of Conduct. The window of opportunity 
closed for those governments that sought a stronger regulation of the role of MNEs. 
 
The second oil-price shock in 1979 had been absorbed, and the price of oil was actually 
falling, while the organization of producer cartels was not successful, weakening the 
actual and psychological bargaining power of developing countries. The debt crisis that 
began in the early 1980s27 not only further undermined the bargaining power of the 
developing world, but actually led to a greater appreciation for the benefits of long-term 
capital as embodied in FDI. Later on, the disintegration of the socialist camp deprived 
developing countries of an important ally. Most importantly, the benefits of FDI came to 
be more appreciated, and countries had learned, at least to a certain extent, how to benefit 
                                                 
25 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1976). 
26 It should be noted in this context that the OECD countries had agreed much earlier among themselves on 
instruments liberalizing capital movements and invisible transactions (OECD, Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements, and OECD, Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, both adopted in 
1961). 
27 In August 1982, Mexico’s finance minister informed the chairperson of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary and the IMF Managing Director that Mexico would be unable to meet its obligation to 
service its debt that month. By October 1983, 27 countries had rescheduled their debts, and more followed. 
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties—Lessons for the Future. Volume 1: An 
Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980s and Early 1990s, at 191, available at: 





more from such investment. The general acceptance of market-based development, as 
promoted in the framework of the Washington Consensus,28 provided the overall 
framework for a change in approach toward FDI and the activities of MNEs.  
 
As the benefits of FDI came to be seen as out-weighing its costs (and the costs could be 
reduced through appropriate policies), the cost/benefit calculation of host developing 
countries changed. With it, the approach of developing countries (and eventually also that 
of the formerly socialist countries) to the regulatory framework for FDI changed, from 
controlling MNEs to attracting FDI. Red carpets replaced red tape, as well as the laws, 
regulations and mechanisms that had been put in place to control MNEs. This occurred 
both at the national and international levels. 
 
At the national level, countries (and not only developing ones) moved strongly – some 
more, some less --in the direction of creating a more welcoming framework for FDI. 
While systematic data are not available for the 1980s, they do exist for regulatory 
changes beginning in 1992. In particular, out of 2,748 changes in national FDI laws in 
countries across the world between that year and the end of 2009, 89 percent made the 
investment climate more welcoming for foreign direct investors (table 2). A good part of 
the changes involved the reduction or elimination of entry conditions for MNEs, 
facilitating their operations and offering incentives for foreign investors. 
 
Table 2. National regulatory changes, 1992-2009 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy 
(New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2010), p. 77. 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, furthermore, countries not only sought to make the investment 
climate more welcoming, but they also made active and increasing efforts to attract FDI. 
The instrument of choice became investment promotion agencies (IPAs). Eventually, 
nearly all countries established such agencies, increasingly also at the sub-national level. 
In 1995, the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies was set up, whose 
membership had grown to 249 by March 2011, from 157 countries.29 Worldwide, an 
estimated 8,000 government agencies at the national and sub-national levels have the 
mandate to attract foreign investors.30 Among the various instruments IPAs use for this 
                                                 
28 John Williamson coined the phrase in 1990 “to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice 
being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989.” John 
Williamson, “What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus?” World Bank Research 
Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 251-264. 
29 See http://www.waipa.org/why.htm (last accessed March 16, 2011). 
30 See, Millennium Cities Initiative and Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, 
Handbook for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment in Medium-size, Low-budget Cities in Emerging 






purpose are investment incentives, whose incidence and importance have risen 
substantially over the past two decades. As a result, the world market for FDI has become 
highly competitive. 
 
It is against this background of a changing cost/benefit calculation and the nature of the 
regulatory changes at the national level that international investment rule-making 
continued, but now with developed countries in the driver’s seat. In line with the 
objectives of developed (home) countries, efforts to define and enforce the 
responsibilities of MNEs were largely abandoned. Instead, the focus shifted toward 
countries assuming binding responsibilities for the treatment (and especially the 
protection) of foreign investors, further strengthened by procedural rights that provided 
for investor-State dispute settlement in case investors felt aggrieved by host country 
governments; moreover, host countries increasingly also assumed commitments 
(although hesitantly) regarding the improvement of conditions governing the entry and 
operations of MNEs. In other words, the pervasive liberalization trend at the national 
level became complemented by the rapid rise of international investment agreements 
(IIAs) (i.e., agreements that, in one way or another, address FDI matters in a substantial 
manner, with bilateral investment treaties most prominent among them), with these 
agreements focusing on the protection of investors and also the liberalization of the 
conditions for their operations. The international investment regime that is a result of this 
development has become an important parameter for national policy making. 
 
There remains however an important difference between the extent to which developing 
countries were prepared to assume commitments at the multilateral level, compared to the 
regional and bilateral levels.  
 
At the multilateral level, the most important successes of the developed countries 
included agreement on the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (1985),31 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)32 and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs),33 the latter two negotiated in the framework of 
the Uruguay Round of GATT (concluded in 1994).  On the other hand, efforts to 
formulate Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992),34 undertaken 
in the framework of the World Bank Group, yielded only a voluntary instrument. The 
effort, especially of the European Union and Japan, to include investment in the 
negotiations of the WTO Doha Round (launched in 2001) (as part of the “Singapore 
issues”) yielded a mandate35 to clarify key elements of an eventual multilateral 
                                                                                                                                                 
performance of these agencies at the national level, see IFC, Global Investment Promotion Benchmarking 
2009: Summary Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).  
31 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 24 ILM 1598 (1985). 
32 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 1869 UNTS 183; 33 ILM 1167 (1994). This 
agreement is particularly important, as FDI in services accounts for the bulk of FDI flows and stock. 
33 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), 1868 UNTS 186. 
34 World Bank Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment 21 September 1992, published as Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment (Volume II, Guidelines) (World Bank, 1992), reproduced as 21 ILM 1363 (1992). 





framework on investment and to move to formal negotiations after the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO (2003); but failure to reach consensus at that 
Conference led to the discontinuation of further discussions of investment in the WTO – 
at least for the time being.  
 
In all these instances, it was the opposition of developing countries that prevented more 
far-reaching agreements: they resisted, where they could, the assumption of greater 
binding responsibilities vis-à-vis foreign investors that would reduce their national policy 
space and limit their right to regulate – mirroring in this manner the efforts of developed 
countries during the 1970s to limit the imposition of responsibilities on MNEs. The 
agreement to establish the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was 
adopted (at the time of the debt crisis) because it limits itself to offering FDI insurance to 
MNEs from developed and developing countries, i.e., it did not contain standards of 
treatment.36 The GATS and TRIMs Agreement were opposed by developing countries, 
but became part of a broader trade-off in the framework of the Uruguay Round; besides, 
GATS most notably adopted a positive list approach to scheduling commitments (which 
allows countries to enter into commitments on a sector-by-sector basis when they see fit 
to do so), while the TRIMs Agreement was restricted to clarifying the application of 
existing GATT Articles (III and IV) to four performance requirements. The World Bank 
effort remained voluntary as it was judged, from the beginning, that a mandatory effort 
                                                                                                                                                 
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and competition 
policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement, and on the 
understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in 
the future, we also agree to: 
• Establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment 
• …… These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon 
and be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate 
intergovernmental fora. As regards UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as 
provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the contribution it can make to the 
understanding of issues. In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we encourage 
cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available resources and 
to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account. The General 
Council will keep the work of each body under review, and will determine after two years 
how the work of each body should proceed. It is clearly understood that future 
negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only 
after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members regarding such 
negotiations. 
World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 13 December 1996. 
36 MIGA offers political insurance to enterprises from its 173 members (148 of which are developing 
countries) for investments in developing countries against risks, such as expropriation, war and civil unrest, 
transfer restrictions, and breach of contract. The investors must be nationals of members other than the 
country. See: http://www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm?stid=1547. The MIGA Convention does 
however specify that members recognize subrogation (Art. 18 (b) and it refers to expropriation and similar 
measures under covered risks (Art. 11). In  Art. 12 (d), in the context of “eligible investments”, the 
Convention specifies: "In guaranteeing an investment, the Agency shall satisfy itself as to: (i) the economic 
soundness of the investment and its contribution to the development of the host country; (ii) compliance of 
the investment with the host country's laws and regulations; (iii) consistency of the investment with the 
declared development objectives and priorities of the host country; and (iv) the investment conditions in the 






would not be successful.37  And the attempt to launch negotiations on a multilateral 
investment framework in the WTO had faced, from the beginning, the resistance of key 
developing countries (although it was supported by others), and eventually was 
abandoned in the context of stalled progress of the overall Doha Round, among other 
reasons, because the benefits of a multilateral approach had not been demonstrated, while 
the costs of a multilateral agreement (in terms of having to enter binding commitments 
regarding the treatment of foreign investors, possibly coupled with cross-retaliation in 
cases of infringements) were clear. The WTO exercise, moreover, followed the aborted 
attempt of developed countries to negotiate -- among themselves, in the framework of the 
OECD -- a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, an effort that was abandoned in 1998 
for lack of consensus among the negotiating parties – not because the stumbling block 
was the trade off between rights and responsibilities of countries and firms, but because, 
at the bottom, key constituencies did not see the benefit of a compromise that left out 
developing countries while adding little to the already existing framework among 
developed countries.38 
 
At the regional and bilateral levels, however, the regulatory framework for international 
investment developed rapidly, focusing almost entirely, in a mandatory manner, on the 
responsibilities of host countries vis-à-vis MNEs. Developing countries were willing to 
enter into commitments at these levels since they did that in the context of trade-offs in 
specific regional settings and since, in the context of bilateral agreements, they could 
protect themselves through exceptions. Moreover, in their efforts to attract FDI in 
competition with other countries, they were individually prepared to grant rights that they 
were not willing to grant multilaterally.39 
 
As a result, bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of investment (BITs) 
proliferated rapidly (figure 1).40 They are complemented by bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements containing substantial investment commitments (figure 1); most modern 
free trade agreements are also free investment agreements. (Double taxation treaties 
(DTTs) are also of immediate relevance to foreign investors.) Collectively, these 
agreements, including regional and multilateral agreements covering investment, are 




                                                 
37 Communication by Antonio Parra. 
38 The documentation of the MAI negotiation process is available on the OECD website. See 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/ (last visited May 11, 2009). See also Edward Montgomery Graham, Fighting 
the Wrong Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multinational Enterprises (Washington DC: Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 2000) and UNCTAD, “Lessons from the MAI,” UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999), available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitm22.en.pdf. 
39 See Andrew T. Guzman, “Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: explaining the popularity of bilateral 
investment treaties,” Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 38 (1998), pp. 639-688.  
40 For the most comprehensive database on BITs, see UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/iia. 
41 Important also are double taxation treaties, of which there were 2,894 in existence at the end of 2009. 
See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy (New York and 









Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy 
(New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2010), p. 82. 
 
The first BIT was signed in 1959.42 By the end of 1970, only 53 BITs had been signed 
(although many of them were still relatively weak -- compared to now -- in terms of 
protections and dispute settlement). Their number began to grow slowly during the 1970s 
(when 71 BITs were signed), blossomed during the 1980s (when 243 BITs were signed) 
and really took off in the 1990s (between 1991 and the end of 2000, 1,549 treaties were 
signed), 43 for a total of 2,750 BITs at the end of 2009, involving 179 countries.44 At the 
beginning, and especially during the 1970s, BITs were partly meant to counteract the 
efforts of developing (and socialist) countries to weaken customary international 
investment law. Since then, they have become – by design -- the most important 
international instruments for the protection of international investment as they enshrine 
key protection standards in legally binding international agreements. The most significant 
of these are national and most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, 
protections against expropriation (and the payment of compensation in case they should 
occur under specified conditions), transfer of funds, and access to international arbitration 
when disputes occur. All of them impose binding obligations on countries in their 
capacity as host countries. 
 
                                                 
42 Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan. Before that, investment issues were dealt with 
in the context of such treaties as the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties of the U.S. BITs 
essentially took out the investment issue from these treaties and dealt with them in separate treaties, which, 
by now, have become substantial and detailed legal documents. The US Model BIT, for example, grew 
from 18 pages in 1984 to 40 pages in 2004. 
43 See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2000), 
available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 






Free trade and investment agreements often contain various protection standards, but may 
also prescribe a liberalization of the investment framework. As of the end of 2009, 295 
such agreements had been signed, and many more were under negotiation. Some 
relatively recent BITs, too, go beyond protection and contain liberalization provisions, 
especially regarding entry and operational conditions for MNEs. The United States, 
Canada and Japan lead in this respect. 
 
 The effectiveness of IIAs in terms of protecting foreign investors has risen with the 
active utilization of the investor-State dispute-settlement mechanism that most of them 
have. There were few international investor-State arbitrations during the 1980s and the 
first half of the 1990s (figure 2). By the end of 2009, however, at least 357 known45 
 
Figure 2. Known investment treaty arbitrations, cumulative and newly instituted 
cases, 1989–2009  
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy 
(New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2010), p. 84. 
 
international treaty-based arbitration cases had been initiated.46 Some two-thirds arose 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the rest in 
other institutions. At least 81 countries, led by Argentina (table 3), are (or had been) 
respondents by the end of 2009. Governments from all groups of countries were (or had 
been) respondents: 49 governments of developing countries, 17 of developed ones and 15 
                                                 
45 Only ICSID reports the number of cases; hence the actual number of disputes is likely to be higher. The 
following data are from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, op. cit. (UNCTAD has the most 
comprehensive database on international investment disputes.) For a discussion of the reasons for this 
explosion of investment disputes, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Explaining the increased recourse to treaty-
based investment dispute settlement,” in Karl P. Sauvant with Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds., Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 105–126. 
46 According to UNCTAD, 78% of the known cases had been initiated (by the end of 2007) on the basis of 
an alleged violation of a BIT provision, followed by 14% under NAFTA and 6% under the Energy Charter 
Treaty. See UNCTAD, “The development dimension of international investment agreements,” doc. 






of economies in transition. Although the great majority of disputes were initiated by 
MNEs from developed countries, firms from emerging markets are increasingly 
becoming active as well.47 UNCTAD reports that, out of the 164 cases concluded by the 
end of 2009, 62 were decided in favor of the State and 47 in favor of the investor.48 These 
disputes can be quite costly, both as far the awards are concerned49 and the costs of 
litigation.50  They cover a wide range of issues.51 
 




Source: UNCTAD, “Latest developments in investor-State dispute settlement,” IIA 
Monitor No. 1 (2009), UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2009/6, available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf 
 
The number of disputes may not appear high. However, it needs to be considered that the 
majority of the cases were only initiated recently: over half during 2005–2009; in other 
                                                 
47 For example, by investors from Chile, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Oman, Peru, Russia, and 
Singapore, accounting for about one-tenth of all disputes. Information from UNCTAD. 
48 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, op. cit., p. 83. Fifty-five cases were settled. 
49 See Susan D. Franck, “Empirically evaluating claims about investment treaty arbitration,” North 
Carolina Law Review, vol. 86 (2007), pp. 1-89, 58. The lowest damage award (aside from cases that 
resulted in no damages) was US$ 24,603, and the highest, US$ 269,814,000; id., pp. 58–59. The average 
figure given in the text includes awards of zero dollars. See, however, the critique by Gus van Harten of the 
methodology used by Franck in: “The use of quantitative methods to examine possible bias in investment 
arbitration”, in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-2011 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011 forthcoming). 
50 The costs of litigation of individual cases can be several million dollars. 
51 See Ian A. Laird and Borzu Sabahi, “Trends in international investment disputes: 2007 in review,” in 
Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 79-116; Ian A. Laird, Borzu Sabahi, Frederic G. Sourgens, and Sobia Haque, 
“International investment law and arbitration: 2008/2009 in review”, in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2009-2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 87 -
176; and Ian A. Laird, Borzu Sabahi and Frederic G. Sourgens, “International investment law and 
arbitration: 2009/2010 in review”, in International Investment Yearbook 2010-2011, op cit. See also 
UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review (New York and Geneva: 






words, the number of disputes has only recently taken off (even if Argentina were to be 
excluded), and they involve a great number of countries. This compares to 91 panel 
reports issued under Article XXIII of the GATT52 between 1948 and the end of 1994, and 
161 panels established by the Dispute Settlement Body under the WTO between the 
beginning of 1995 and November 24, 2008.53 It must be noted, however, that only States 
can bring disputes in the GATT/WTO, whereas all of the investment disputes reported 
here were brought by investors.54 In fact, there is considerable potential for a substantial 
further increase in the number of investment disputes, if one considers that there are over 
3,000 IIAs55 (and even more if one takes the relationships into account that are 
established by regional, inter-regional or multilateral investment agreements), most of 
which contain dispute-settlement provisions; and that there are a great number of MNEs 
and foreign affiliates worldwide, most of which, depending on the applicable treaty 
language, could in principle initiate an international arbitration case if they feel 
aggrieved.56 As José Alvarez put it: “What this means is that, unlike the case with the 
WTO, which relies on member states to file claims against one another, the investment 
regime is enforced by the roughly 77,000 parent firms or MNCs that engage in FDI. 
These firms, not their home states, are the regime’s private attorneys general.”57 The rise 
of investment disputes reflects the confidence of international investors to stand up for 
what they consider to be their rights under international investment agreements. 
 
4. Toward rebalancing 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s marked the high-water mark of the creation of an 
investment environment favorable for MNEs and FDI.  Led by the developed countries, 
virtually all countries had liberalized, albeit to various degrees, their national regulatory 
regimes for FDI and strengthened the protection of foreign investors by enshrining it in 
binding international treaties that define the responsibilities of host countries and the 
rights of foreign investors. This opened markets for foreign investors and made it safer 
for them than at any time in the recent past to establish themselves abroad. 
 
As a result, the international investment law regime has never been stronger than today as 
far as investors are concerned. To quote Jeswald Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan: “In 
most cases, a foreign investor benefiting from a BIT may now look to a comprehensive, 
specific, and largely uncontested set of international legal rules, with recourse to 
                                                 
52 Note that several panel reports were not adopted. There were also 24 panel reports issued under the 
Tokyo Round Codes; many of these were not adopted either. Information provided by the WTO. 
53 A total of 199 disputes were covered by the 161 panels established. Of these disputes, 87 were resolved 
with mutually agreed solutions or were withdrawn, and 118 panel reports were adopted. Information 
provided by the WTO. 
54 There are also a handful of disputes before ICSID brought by States that are based on contracts (as 
opposed to treaties). 
55 DTTs excluded. 
56 Depending on treaty language, individual shareholders may be entitled to initiate disputes as well. 
57 José E. Alvarez, “Contemporary foreign investment law: An empire of law or the law of empire -- 





international tribunals for enforcement.”58 This, they continued, compares with a 
situation, some 30 yeas ago, when “foreign investors who sought the protection of 
international investment law encountered an ephemeral structure consisting largely of 
scattered treaty provisions, a few questionable customs, and contested general principles 
of law.”59 In fact, Thomas W. Wälde asserted:  
 
Investment treaties…have built, indubitably, one of the most effective and truly 
legal regimes within the fragmented and mostly quite rudimentary institutional 
frameworks for the global economy. Comparable in terms of legal character and 
effectiveness to the WTO regime, the international investment regime is arguably 
more advanced, as it fully incorporates the most important and directly affected 
non-state actors. In a longer-term perspective, claimants (and their lawyers), who 
are essentially driven by private interests, help ensure greater compliance and 
effectiveness for the treaties and their underlying objectives than can or is 
achieved by exclusively inter-state implementation procedures. It also goes 
beyond the prospective-remedy-only sanction available under the WTO.60  
 
And he added: “Investment arbitration is arguably the most astounding success in 
international law over the past decades…”61 
 
At the same time, as argued in the following sections, countervailing forces were and are 
at work. An increasing number of commentators62 see the international investment law 
and policy regime in need of rebalancing as far as its orientation is concerned and in need 
                                                 
58 Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas P. Sullivan, “Do BITs really work: An evaluation of bilateral 
investment treaties and their grand bargain”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 46 (2005), pp. 67-
130, 70.  
59 Ibid, p. 71. 
60 Thomas W. Wälde, “Improving the mechanisms for treaty negotiation and investment disputes: 
competition and choice as the path to quality and legitimacy,” in International Investment Yearbook 2008-
2009, op. cit., pp. 505-584, 514. 
61 Ibid., p. 543. 
62 One of the first to suggest this was José E. Alvarez, see José E. Alvarez, “Remarks”, American Society of 
International Law, Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting, Apr. 1-4, 1992, at 550-555 (1992). See also; 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Regulating multinational corporations: towards principles of cross-border legal 
frameworks in a globalized world balancing rights with responsibilities,” American University 
International Law Review, vol. 23, issue 3 (2008), pp. 451-558; Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); José E. Alvarez, "The evolving 
foreign investment regime," http://www.asil.org/ilpost/president/pres080229.html; José E. Alvarez, “The 
once and future foreign investment regime,” in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert D. 
Sloane, and Siegfried Wiessner, eds., Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. 
Michael Reisman (Leiden and Boston: Brill Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); Peter Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); M. Sornarajah, The 
International Law of Foreign Investment, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
M. Sornarajah, “A coming crisis: expansionary trends in investment treaty arbitration,” in Sauvant with 
Chiswick-Patterson, op. cit., pp. 39-80; and Brigitte Stern, “The future of international investment law: a 
balance between the protection of investors and the states’ capacity to regulate,” in José E. Alvarez and 
Karl P. Sauvant, with Kamil Gérard Ahmed and Gabriela del P. Vizcaino, eds., The Evolving Investment 
Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Of course, there are 
differences between these various authors. For example, some call for radical changes, while others focus 





of improvement as far as its operation is concerned, and this issue is also on the political 
agenda.63  In particular, the question of the proper balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of host countries and MNEs is back on the agenda, as is the question of 
what form this should take. This, in turn, is embedded in the broader issue of a certain re-
evaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI and hence the interest situations of countries 
and the objectives they pursue, as well as changing policy approaches to FDI at the 
national level. 
 
a. Changes at the national level  
 
To be sure, individual countries continue to liberalize their FDI regulatory frameworks, 
actively seek to attract foreign investors and further conclude IIAs with strong protection 
standards and liberalizing provisions. And it may well be that governments, needing to 
increase investment to come out of the recession, will even double their efforts in this 
respect, at least during the next few years. 
  
However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the attitudes of governments vis-à-vis FDI 
are the result of an explicit or implicit calculation of the costs and benefits of such 
investment, including those of a non-economic nature. For governments, FDI is first of 
all a tool that helps them to advance their countries’ economic development. It is 
welcome as long as its benefits outweigh its negative effects. During the past 25 years or 
so, this calculation ended in favor of a positive contribution of FDI – hence the regulatory 
developments as described above.  
 
This calculation is changing as a number of governments are re-evaluating the costs and 
benefits of FDI in general and those of cross-border M&As in particular.64 This is all the 
more important, as M&As are the preferred65 form of market entry for MNEs. Suspicion 
can be particularly high when M&As are undertaken by private equity funds, by 
emerging market MNEs (which, as shown earlier, are increasingly investing abroad) and, 
                                                 
63 See the reference to the May 2009 Hearings in the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means 
Committee of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, referred to below. 
64 One cannot, however, say that cross-border M&As are now typically resisted: the bulk of M&As are 
normal commercial transactions (with the only principal constraining consideration being M&As that have 
anti-competitive implication) that receive little attention. But it is indicative that a 2007 Economist 
Intelligence Unit survey of 258 senior executives across Asia found that the United States (24%), China 
(23%), and France (13%) are regarded as the countries most likely to block M&As because of strategic and 
political concerns (see Norton Rose, Cross-border M&A: the Asian Perspective, Economist Intelligence 
Unit and Norton Rose (2007) p. 4). In a survey conducted for another report, respondents expressed 
considerable concern about possible protectionism in a number of emerging-market regions. Among 
developed countries, France and the United States again were the two countries that stood out in terms of 
concern about attitudes of officials to FDI (see Laza Kekic and Karl P. Sauvant, eds., World Investment 
Prospects to 2011: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (Economist Intelligence 
Unit and Columbia Program on International Investment, 2007)). 
65 It is difficult to calculate what share of FDI flows is accounted for by cross-border M&As. It is popular 
to calculate this share by dividing the value of cross-border M&As by the total value of FDI inflows. 
However, this is faulty as cross-border M&As can be financed from sources other than FDI, especially 
funds raised locally or on international capital markets. Dividing the value of cross-border M&As by FDI 
flows would yield the maximum share and would yield a correct result if, and only if, all M&As were 





especially, by sovereign investors from emerging markets (including sovereign wealth 
funds), which are also increasingly investing abroad.66 Add to that the dissatisfaction of 
some governments with the distribution of benefits related to FDI, most notably in the 
natural resources sector.67 Overarching all these concerns is the desire to control one’s 
own economic development, at least to the extent that this is possible in a globalizing 
world economy.68  
 
Economic and non-economic objectives are intertwined, typically captured by the general 
concept of “national interests” (or similar concepts, such as “national security” or 
“essential security interests”), a concept that is tightly linked to strategic sectors and 
national champions, and can trump all other considerations. Advanced especially by 
developed countries,69 these are vague concepts, typically not defined precisely.70 What is 
common to these concepts is that they give governments of host countries discretion to 
limit the applicability of national laws and regulations and international agreements 
relating to investment under certain circumstances. They can also lend themselves to 
misuse for protectionist purposes. 
 
For the United States, which has been preoccupied with terrorism in a post-9/11 world, 
“national interest” has primarily military and strategic political connotations—as with the 
Dubai Ports World and CNOOC cases.71 However, the US is also suspicious of sovereign 
FDI in general, particularly when it originates in a country considered to be potentially 
unfriendly or a strategic competitor.72 For the European Union, Japan, and a number of 
                                                 
66 For example, outward FDI from China doubled from 2007 to 2008, to US$ 52 bn. Some 80-90% of 
China’s outward FDI is undertaken by State-owned enterprises (Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma, “China’s 
outward FDI: Past and future” (July 2007), at 
http://www.nber.org/books_in_progress/china07/cwt07/cheng.pdf). For a discussion of the concerns 
regarding sovereign FDI, see Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, eds., 
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
67 To a certain extent, this is a cyclical phenomenon: when demand for raw materials is high, producer host 
countries seek a larger share of the rent; when demand is low, their bargaining power declines. 
68 For an elaboration of these various concerns, see Karl P. Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces: A 
rebalancing of national FDI policies,” in International Investment Yearbook 2008-2009, op. cit., pp. 215-
272. 
69 In their Declaration at the 2007 Heiligendamm summit, the G8 noted in para. 11: “ […] we remain 
committed to minimize any national restrictions on foreign investment. Such restrictions should apply to 
very limited cases which primarily concern national security.” See Group of 8, “Growth and Responsibility 
in the World Economy: Summit Declaration”, June 7, 2007, available at www.g-
8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-
eng,property=publicationFile.pdf. 
70 Id. For example, the G8 provided only general principles that need to be observed in relation to national 
security, namely: “nondiscrimination, transparency and predictability”.  
71 But even this approach can be quite broad, as “critical infrastructure” is part of the review process by 
CFIUS of incoming M&As; it includes “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact 
on national security..” Exon-Florio Statute (50 USC App. § 2170) as amended by Pub. L. 110-49 (2007) 
(the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, or “FINSA”) at §(1)(a)(6). 
72 Thus, the US Foreign Investment and National Security Act foresees that an M&A in the US by a state-
controlled entity notified to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is subject to an 
investigation, unless specifically exempted from such a review. See The Foreign Investment and National 





developing countries, “national interest” has a strong economic dimension and easily 
blends with considerations of strategic industries and national champions;73 but the 
European Union also keeps an eye on political/military interests, especially when it 
comes to incoming FDI undertaken by state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth 
funds, i.e. sovereign FDI. In developing countries, the concept of “economic security” is 
gaining currency. As with its military and strategic-political counterparts, this concept is 
vague and its boundary lines are unclear. It focuses on promoting economic development, 
including encouraging key industries, maximizing the positive contributions of FDI and 
the activities of MNEs and minimizing any negative impacts, and protecting viable (or 
potentially viable) domestic firms. But the concept has also been evoked in China in the 
context of the dispute between Groupe Danone and Wahaha, a local soft-drink producer, 
as Wahaha is one of the country’s best-known brand names.74  
 
It is a reflection of the changing attitudes toward FDI, the associated cost/benefit 
calculations and the changing interest-situations of various countries, that national FDI 
regulations have become less welcoming in a number of countries. More specifically, 
although the liberalization and promotion trend remains dominant, there has been a 
marked rise in the number of regulatory changes unfavorable to foreign investors since 
the beginning of the 2000s: compared with 6 percent of all regulatory changes over the 
11-year period between 1992 and 2002 that were unfavorable, that percentage rose to 12 
percent of all changes in 2003-2004, 20 percent during 2004-2006, 23 percent during 
2007-2008, and reached 30 percent in 2009 (table 2). This change has been particularly 
marked in Latin America: 60 percent of the regulatory changes occurring in that region in 
2007 disfavored FDI (figure 3). During 2006–2007, the countries worldwide that 
introduced at least one change making the investment climate less welcoming for MNEs 





                                                                                                                                                 
Act of 1988, § 5021, Pub. L. 100-418 (1988), codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170. FINSA was followed by 
the President’s Executive Order of January 2008 (Executive Order 13456, Further Amendment of 
Executive Order 11858 Concerning Foreign Investment in the United States, January 23, 2008) and the 
final regulations issued by the Treasury Department (31 CFR Part 800: Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons; Final Rule, November 21, 2008). See also the discussion 
below. 
73 French policymakers, for example, speak about “economic patriotism” (“De Villepin stands by calls for 
‘economic patriotism,” Financial Times, September 22, 2005, at 
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto092220051434330491) and include casinos among the 
country’s strategic industries. The issue of national champions came into play when there was a rumor that 
Pepsi (U.S.) might want to acquire France’s Danone, one of the world’s leading yogurt producers. 
74 As noted in an article in the China Daily (June 20, 2007, quoting the spokesperson of H&J Vanguard, a 
Beijing-based consultancy firm): “Danone’s bid on Wahaha jeopardizes a national brand and threatens the 
nation’s economic security.”  
75 Author’s calculation, based on data supplied by UNCTAD. David Marchick and Matthew Slaughter 
came to a similar result for 2006, based on data for eleven countries that had adopted or were considering 
laws and regulations restricting certain types of FDI or expanding government oversight over it. David 
Marchick and Matthew Slaughter, “Global FDI policy: correcting a protectionist drift,” Council on Foreign 





Figure 3. National FDI policy changes, by region, 2007 
 
 
Source: James X. Zhan, “Recent global rends: FDI flows, TNCs and policies” (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2008), mimeo. 
 
What this suggests is that national attitudes in a number of countries toward FDI are 
changing. Some of the policy measures that have been introduced in this context may 
well be protectionist in nature – as recognized at the highest government levels, namely 
the G8 and G20.76 
                                                 
76 In their declaration issued by the G8 leaders at their 2007 Heiligendamm summit, they took note of 
increasing FDI regulatory risk when they observed that there were tendencies toward FDI protectionism. 
More specifically, paragraph 10 of the declaration noted: “We will work together to strengthen open and 
transparent investment regimes and to fight against tendencies to restrict them. Erecting barriers and 
supporting protectionism would result in a loss of prosperity. We therefore agree on the central role of free 
and open markets for the world economy, respecting sustainability concerns, and the need to maintain open 
markets to facilitate global capital movements. We reaffirm that freedom of investment is a crucial pillar of 
economic growth, prosperity and employment. We call on all developed countries, major emerging 
economies and others to critically assess their investment policies, the potential costs incurred from 
unnecessarily restrictive or arbitrary policies and the economic benefits of open investment regimes.” See 
Group of 8, “Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy: Summit Declaration”, June 7, 2007, 
available at www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-07-gipfeldokument-
wirtschaft-eng,property=publicationFile.pdf.  
Subsequently, the Group of 20, “Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy”, 
November 15, 2008 (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-1.html) 
said in the first paragraph of para. 13: 
“13. We underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of 
financial uncertainty.  In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to 
investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World 
Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.” This call for a moratorium was 
repeated in the Group of 20, “The global plan for recovery and reform,” April 2, 2009 (available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf ). In paragraph 22, the G20 leaders said “We will 







There is no established definition of “FDI protectionism”. The issue is more complex 
than it appears because not every measure taken in the interest of legitimate public policy 
objectives – e.g., seeking to increase the contribution of FDI to the host or home 
economy – is necessarily an instance of FDI protectionism, even if it ends up making the 
investment climate less hospitable for foreign investors. Furthermore, the concept of FDI 
protectionism should cover both inward FDI, on which most attention has focused, and 
outward FDI. In the context of inward FDI, one would expect that “FDI protectionism” 
involves new measures by public authorities that (1) focus solely on foreign investors 
(i.e., domestic investors are not similarly treated in like situations) that (2) are taken to 
prevent or discourage foreign direct investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition or expansion of their operations in a host country or to limit foreign direct 
investors’ management, conduct and sale or other disposition of existing investments. In 
the context of outward FDI, “FDI protectionism” may also involve measures directed at 
domestic companies that require them to repatriate assets or operations to the home 
                                                                                                                                                 
made in Washington: to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, 
imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent 
measures to stimulate exports. In addition we will rectify promptly any such measures. We extend this 
pledge to the end of 2010 […].” This pledge was again extended following the G20 Toronto Summit 
(Toronto, June 26 – 27, 2010); paragraph 36 of the declaration affirms that: “As such, we renew for a 
further three years, until the end of 2013, our commitment to refrain from raising barriers or imposing new 
barriers to investment or trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions or implementing 
World Trade Organization (WTO)-inconsistent measures to stimulate exports, and commit to rectify such 
measures as they arise. We will minimize any negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic 
policy actions, including fiscal policy and action to support the financial sector. We ask the WTO, OECD 
and UNCTAD to continue to monitor the situation within their respective mandates, reporting publicly on 
these commitments on a quarterly basis.” Similarly the communique following the G20 Seoul Summit 
(November 11-12, 2010), paragraph 42: “Recognizing the importance of free trade and investment for 
global recovery, we are committed to keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and investment as a 
means to promote economic progress for all and narrow the development gap. […] We therefore reaffirm 
the extension of our standstill commitments until the end of 2013 as agreed in Toronto, commit to rollback 
any new protectionist measures that may have risen, including export restrictions and WTO-inconsistent 
measures to stimulate exports, and ask the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD to continue monitoring the 
situation and to report publicly on a semi-annual basis.” See also, the Communiqué following the Meeting 
of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Paris, February 18-19, 2011) where in paragraph 9 it is 
noted that: “We reaffirm our commitment to free trade and investment recognizing its central importance 
for the global recovery. We will refrain from introducing, and oppose protectionist trade actions in all 
forms and recognize the importance of a prompt conclusion of the Doha negotiations.” UNCTAD, OECD 
and WTO were mandated to monitor developments in this respect. See, OECD, UNCTAD and WTO, 
“Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures” (September 2009); OECD, UNCTAD and WTO, “Report 
on G20 Trade and Investment Measures (March 2010)”; OECD and UNCTAD, “Third Report on G20 
Investment Measures” (June 2010); and OECD and UNCTAD, “Fourth Report on G20 Investment 
Measures (November 2010)”, all available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=5716&lang=1.  
See also Deputy Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt: “One of the current vulnerabilities that we have seen in 
parts of the world is the rise of protectionist sentiment, epitomized in rhetoric questioning the benefits of 
cross-border investment. . . . The Treasury Department has worked hard to combat investment 
protectionism on multiple fronts . . .,” Remarks of Deputy Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt at the Dubai 





country or discourage certain types of new investments abroad.77 Any definition of “FDI 
protectionism” would need to be supplemented by an illustrative list of measures and 
would need to be contextualized, e.g. in terms of the extent to which a particular new 
measure departs from existing policies within a given country.78 
 
What is significant is that developed countries have led much of the rise of FDI 
protectionism.79 Indicative of this trend is the re-appearance of investment screening 
agencies (which had been replaced beginning in the 1980s by investment promotion 
agencies), exemplified by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) whose standing and role was strengthened considerably by the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007.80 Among the features of this screening 
process is that there is a presumption that M&As by state-controlled entities are subject to 
additional scrutiny in the form of an “investigation”, which follows an initial 30-days 
review, unless certain statutory triggers for terminating the review at 30 days are met. It 
is a reflection of the changed investment climate in the U.S. that notifications to CFIUS 
were up considerably since 2006, although they declined in 2009 due to the impact of the 
Western financial crisis and recession on FDI in the US  (which declined significantly, 
along with M&As into that country) (figure 4).81 
 
If developed countries change their attitudes and policies toward FDI, it is likely to have 
a demonstration effect for emerging markets, leading the latter to reevaluate the costs and 
benefits of such investment as well.82 It would be ironic, though, if developed countries 
would now lead a backlash against FDI and trigger a roll-back of investor protection and 
liberalization, as they had been the ones that, for more than two decades after the 
restrictive 1960s and 1970s during which anti-FDI feelings ran high, had led the efforts to 
create an open investment regime and strengthen protection standards.  
                                                 
77 An example of outward FDI protectionism is when the President of a country encourages one of the firms 
headquartered in that country to repatriate certain production facilities from abroad (See “Europe vows 
quick review of auto bailout plans,” New York Times, February 25, 2009.) or when the off-shoring, via FDI, 
of the production of certain services is being discouraged or not allowed. See UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (Geneva, UNCTAD, 2004), ch. V.B. 
78 I am grateful to José E. Alvarez, Andrea Bjorklund, David Fagan, Vishwas Govitrikar, Peter Muchlinski, 
and Kenneth Vandevelde for their suggestions on this text. 
79 Documented in Sauvant, “Driving and countervailing forces,” op. cit. 
80 See FINSA, op. cit.  
81 The U.S. maintains one of the most open investment frameworks in the world, reaffirmed in May 2007 in 
a statement on “Open Economies” by President George W. Bush and the establishment of “Invest in 
America” within the Department of Commerce. Moreover, virtually all states in the United States fiercely 
compete for FDI. Yet, as the US Secretary of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson, noted, “Economic 
nationalism . . . has been a growing concern in the United States in recent years. . . . Foreign investment 
into the United States, especially by sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises, is also 
increasingly viewed with suspicion by some US companies, various members of the national security 
community, and the American public at large. . . .” (See, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., “A strategic economic 
engagement: Strengthening U.S.-Chinese ties,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 87 (September/October 2008), pp. 50-
77, 72. 
82 As already alluded to before, it is however quite conceivable that the 2008-2009 economic crisis and its 
aftermath will override, at least for the time being, all other considerations as countries may be eager to 
attract whatever investment they can obtain. Should this occur, the question is whether this would be a 






Figure 4. CFIUS filings and investigations, 2001-2009 
 
 
Source: Persephone Economou and Karl P. Sauvant, “Recent trends and issues in foreign 
direct investment, 2010,” in International Investment Yearbook 2010-2011, op. cit. 
 
 
b. Implications for the international investment law and policy regime: The need for 
rebalancing and improvement 
 
 
The reevaluation of the costs and benefits of FDI and the tempering of the overwhelming 
liberalization trend at the national level are bound to be reflected at the international 
level: while the mid-1980s to early 2000s were characterized, grosso modo, by expanding 
binding responsibilities of host countries without obtaining further rights, as well as 
greater binding rights for MNEs without an increase in their responsibilities, it appears 
that we are now entering a period during which the rights of host countries are expanding 
while their responsibilities may actually be narrowed, while MNEs may well see an 
increase in their responsibilities and a curtailment of their rights. More specifically, the 
key changes are toward narrowing key protection provisions for foreign investors while 
recognizing more than before the right of host countries to regulate in the public interest 
matters related to international investment. This process has already begun, and could 
lead to a rebalancing of the substantive and procedural rights of host countries and 
investors and hence the orientation and objectives of the international investment law and 
policy regime. 
 
i. The rights of host countries and MNEs 
 
The substantive rights are the key to a rebalancing of the investment regime. As 
discussed, during the past 20 years or so, that regime was dominated by the objective to 
strengthen the protection of foreign investors (especially through BITs between 
developed countries and emerging markets) and, increasingly, to facilitate their 






BITs of some countries).  The trade-off was supposed to be an increase in FDI flows -- 
this was the “grand bargain.”83 While, intuitively, it is plausible that greater protection 
should encourage greater FDI flows, the empirical evidence in this regard is mixed: a 
number of studies have tested the relationship between the conclusion of BITs and FDI 
flows, and the results have not been clear-cut, i.e. some found such a relationship, others 
did not. The principal reason may be methodological, as it is difficult to isolate the effect 
of a part of the regulatory framework from the much more important effect of economic 
factors, the principal determinants of FDI flows (such as economic growth; market size; 
the quality of infrastructure, skills and innovatory capacity). These economic factors – 
combined with the liberalization of investment regimes, whether unilateral or through 
IIAs -- have driven the rapid growth of FDI flows during the past 20 years, and this 
growth was accompanied by the rapid growth in the number of BITs seeking to protect 
such investment. The bottom line is that the relationship between BITs and FDI flows has 
so far not convincingly been established.84 And that means that the “grand bargain” does 
not appear to deliver85 higher FDI flows as a result of the treaties host countries 
conclude.86  What is clear, however, is that BITs have sovereignty costs in terms of the 
responsibilities that countries assume concerning the treatment of foreign investors. 
 
With the rapid rise of international investment disputes, these costs can also become costs 
in terms of dollars and cents, as documented earlier. Such disputes not only involve 
emerging markets as respondents, but also, as noted above, a growing number of 
developed countries. One of the latter is the U.S., which had been involved in 19 NAFTA 
Chapter 11 investment disputes as of November 2010,87 but has lost, so far, none. Still, 
                                                 
83 See the title of the article by Salacuse and Sullivan, op. cit. 
84 The principal studies undertaken during the past ten years, as well as a summarizing overview, are 
contained in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, eds., The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). One of the reasons that there appears to be a relationship between US BITs and 
FDI flows from the US to countries that concluded such agreements with the U.S. may well be that US 
BITs tend to contain liberalization provisions, especially national treatment at the pre-establishment phase; 
in those cases, it is difficult to separate the protection effect from the liberalization effect. In addition, the 
U.S. has BITs with a number of countries that also have free trade agreements with the U.S. (e.g. Bahrain, 
Jordan, Morocco); hence there is the additional difficulty of distinguishing between the effects of BITs and 
those of free trade agreements. (For example, a World Bank study found that regional agreements that 
create larger markets positively affect FDI inflows when other institutional variables affecting the 
investment climate are satisfactory (though agreements that do not result in larger markets do not positively 
affect FDI flows); see Richard Newfarmer, “Beyond merchandise trade: Services, investment, intellectual 
property, and labor mobility,” in Global Economic Prospects 97, at 109 (2005), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf). Finally, US BITs are 
precondition to access OPIC investment insurance – another effect that, properly speaking, would need to 
be controlled for. 
85 Negotiators were (and presumably are) not unaware of this: Kenneth J. Vandevelde reported that US BIT 
negotiators alerted their negotiations partners that BITs would not necessarily lead to higher investment 
flows; see his United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice (Boston: Kluwer, 1992), p. 32.  
86 There are of course other reasons for which IIAs are concluded. Roberto Echandi, for example, argues 
that these agreements help especially developing countries to undertake – and protect– reforms of their 
domestic regulatory frameworks for the treatment of enterprises in general. See Roberto Echandi, “What do 
developing countries expect from the international investment regime,” in Alvarez et al., op. cit. 






the possibility that BITs (and IIAs in general) can bite, and not only emerging markets, is 
leading a number of developed countries to become more sensitive about the breadth of 
certain rights that these agreements confer upon investors, with a view toward defining 
them more clearly and making them less expansive, while at the same time giving more 
rights to governments. 
 
The U.S. has led this process, along with Canada.88 Nowhere might the direction be 
clearer into which the international investment regime may be moving than when 
comparing the US Model BIT from 1984 (around the time that marked the beginning of 
the protection and liberalization phase, when strengthening investor rights was the 
priority) with the US Model BIT of 2004 (around the time when the pendulum had begun 
to swing back toward safeguarding more the rights of host countries). Without doing 
justice to the complexity of many of these revisions, the changes between the two model 
treaties that clearly seem to narrow investors’ rights in the 2004 model are as follows (see 
the annex for a greater elaboration):89 
 
* Includes the explicit right of host countries to regulate investments to protect 
health, safety and the environment. 
* Narrows the definition of “investment” to limit coverage of a treaty. 
* Narrows the scope of national and MFN treatment obligations by increasing 
allowances for exemptions and eliminating a separate clause on “arbitrary and 
discriminatory” action. 
* Eliminates the “umbrella clause”, allowing investors to bring claims involving 
rights in investment contracts to investor-state arbitration only if such claims 
also involve an alleged host country violation of a treaty guarantee as well.  
* Reduces the scope of the “minimum standard of treatment” to the standard 
under customary international law. 
* Limits transparency requirements of host countries’ investment-related laws and 
administrative practices to only those acts having “general application.” 
* Limits the scope of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” guarantees. 
* Omits a previous provision assuring investors’ rights to pursue claims in 
national courts. 
* Exempts the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights 
from the expropriation clause when they are in accord with the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
* Requires expropriation claims based on taxation measures to be submitted to 
both state parties’ tax authorities before arbitration. 
                                                 
88 See the Canadian 2004 Model BIT at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf. 
89 For a full analysis, see José E. Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime”, op. cit., and 
(for a comparison of the 1994 Model and the 2004 one) Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “A comparison of the 2004 
and 1994 U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing investor and host country interests,” in International Investment 





* Eliminates the “tantamount to expropriation” language, limits the expropriation 
treaty right to that in customary international law, and subjects claims of 
“indirect expropriation” to a case-by-case review procedure.  
* States that non-discriminatory regulatory actions taken to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives are not “indirect” takings except in rare circumstances. 
* Imposes a 90-days notice indicating the basis of each of an investor’s claims 
and a three-year statute of limitations. 
* Includes a more expansive and self-judging “essential security” clause and a 
new exception for measures “relating to financial services for prudential 
reasons” or “in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies or exchange rate 
policies.” 
* Authorizes state parties to issue interpretations of a treaty that are binding on 
arbitrators. 
 
The differences between these two models – each reflecting, for its time, the ideal BIT 
the U.S. sought to negotiate -- is stark indeed. According to José E. Alvarez: “The United 
States … is no longer as sanguine about proposing open-ended relative or absolute 
guarantees to foreign investors or about its ability to comply with these….  While the 
new U.S. Model does not protect host states as much as did the NIEO, it is not farfetched 
to suggest that its new text evinces a new found respect for many of the  ‘sovereign 
rights’ that the United States ridiculed at the General Assembly during the 1970s.”90 
 
Some of the revisions in the US Model reflect changes that had already occurred in US 
treaty practice before the new model was released in 2004 or, for that matter, was 
underway. For example, in the framework of the North American Free Trade 
Commission, the U.S., Canada and Mexico limited (2001) the meaning of the scope of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard to the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens.91 Similarly, the U.S. Government negotiated the 
Singapore (2003)92 and Chile (2004)93 free trade agreements while it was preparing the 
2004 BITs model; hence those two agreements influenced the 2004 Model as well.  
 
Thus, the 2004 US Model BIT captured and reconciled changes that were already 
contained or underway in US IIAs and consolidated them in a new instrument that 
reflected the orientation and objectives of the government at that time. Subsequent BITs 
                                                 
90 Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime”, op. cit., pp. 31, 36. 
91 See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 
2001) (available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-
diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx?lang=en, last visited May 11, 2009.) Article 2 on “Minimum Standard of 
Treatment in Accordance with International Law” states, “1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be 
afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.” 
92 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 






(with Uruguay (2005) and Rwanda (2008)94 were based on the 2004 model, as were the 
free trade agreements with investment chapters that were concluded.95 They reflect 
therefore the approach taken in the 2004 Model BIT, not only as regards substantive 
provisions (especially limiting the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment96 and 
indirect expropriation97 -- two key protection standards) but also concerning procedural 
rights (especially transparency in the dispute-settlement process),98 submission of 
                                                 
94 United States-Uruguay BIT, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf; United 
States-Rwanda BIT, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Rwa/asset_upload_file743_14523.pdf.The US is in 
negotiations with other countries, based on the model BIT.  
95 Since the beginning of 2004, the U.S. has concluded bilateral free trade agreements with: Australia 
(2005), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html (however, 
this agreement does not foresee investor-State dispute settlement), Chile (2004), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html, Morocco 
(2006), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_Index.html, Oman 
(2006), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html, Peru (2009), 
available at: http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html, 
and is also part of the Dominican Republic- Central American FTA (2006), available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html.. 
The U.S.-Colombia FTA, the U.S.-Republic of Korea FTA, and the U.S.-Panama FTA have investment 
chapters, but are still awaiting approval by Congress 
(http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html  
and http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Section_Index.html). There are of 
course variations among these various agreements, especially in terms of refinements of language.  
96 See, for example, article 5(1)(2) of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT:  “Article 5:  Minimum Standard of Treatment.  
1.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international 
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.   
2.  For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments.  The 
concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive 
rights.  The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide:   
(a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the 
principal legal systems of the world; and  
(b) “full protection and security” requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required 
under customary international law.” (Footnote omitted.) 
 (http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf ). 
97 According to the United-States Singapore free trade agreement, the concept of “indirect expropriation”  
has to be interpreted on the basis of a number of criteria, and “Except in rare circumstances, 
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations”. See the letter exchange on expropriation at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file708
_4036.pdf. 
98Article 10.21(1) of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Act provides that the respondent in an 
investment dispute will make available to the public: “(a) the notice of intent; (b) the notice of arbitration; 





“amicus briefs”,99 and the possibility to issue interpretations of treaties that are binding on 
arbitrators100). Potentially important for the further development of the dispute-settlement 
system is the inclusion, in a number of US treaties, of provisions concerning an appellate 
body for purposes of reviewing awards rendered by investment tribunals.101 
 
One of the changes deserves special attention, namely the nature of the “essential 
security” clause, as it potentially has far-reaching effects on the international law and 
policy regime; it permits governments to take measures ordinarily in violation of treaty 
provisions, but necessary to protect vital interests. It is common that international 
agreements contain “essential security” (or similar) clauses.102 This is also the case in 
BITs and free trade agreements with investment chapters. Often, the question of whether 
or not an essential security (or similar) clause has been evoked in good faith rests (in the 
case of conflicts) with arbitrators. For example, in most international investment 
arbitration cases involving Argentina the question arises of whether or not the country 
faced an essential (economic) security situation during its most recent (2001) crisis or 
not, and hence could disregard certain BIT commitments. The government argued that it 
did, investors argued that it did not – and the tribunals and annulment committees dealing 
with this issue came to differing conclusions.103  
                                                                                                                                                 
transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and (e) orders, awards, and decisions of the 
tribunal.” Article 10.21(2) states that “The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and shall 
determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements….” The 
Article includes provisions to protect “information designated as protection information” from disclosure. 
 (http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html)  
99 Article 21.10(d) of the United States-Peru TPA states that “The Parties shall establish by the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement Model Rules of Procedure, which shall ensure…that the panel will consider 
requests from non-governmental entities in the disputing Parties’ territories to provide written views 
regarding the dispute that may assist the panel in evaluating the submissions and arguments of the disputing 
Parties…” Id. 
100 Article 30(3) of the United States - Uruguay BIT states that “A joint decision of the Parties, each acting 
through its representative designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their interpretation of a 
provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must 
be consistent with that joint decision.” 
(http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf) 
101 Included in the DR-CAFTA, US-Chile FTA, US-Morocco FTA, US-Singapore FTA, US-Oman FTA, 
US-Columbia TPA, US-Panama TPA, US-Peru TPA, US- Uruguay BIT, US-Republic of Korea FTA, and 
US-Rwanda BIT. For example, Annex E of the US-Uruguay BIT states, “Within three years after the date 
of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or 
similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they 
establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.” Article 28(10) of the same treaty also states “If a 
separate multilateral agreement enters into force between the Parties that establishes an appellate body for 
purposes of reviewing awards rendered by tribunals constituted pursuant to international trade or 
investment arrangements to hear investment disputes, the Parties shall strive to reach an agreement that 
would have such appellate body review awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after 
the multilateral agreement enters into force between the Parties.” 
(http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf) 
102 Article 21(1) of the GATT, for examples, states that “Nothing in this agreement shall be construed: (a) 
to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to 
its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests…”( 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI) 






An important development is that the 2004 US Model BIT amends the 1984 Model BIT 
essential security clause to specify that either state party can take measures “that it 
considers necessary” (italics added) to protect its essential security interests (article 
18).104 Subsequently, this formulation was included, for example, in the US-Uruguay 
BIT105 and the Peru-US Trade Promotion Agreement (which contains an investment 
chapter);106 the latter agreement also contains a footnote to the relevant article that says: 
“[f]or greater certainty, if a Party invokes [the essential security clause] in an arbitral 
proceeding…the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception 
applies.”107  
 
What are the implications of these developments? To begin with, at least in US treaty 
practice, substantive rights of investors are being circumscribed as regards key protection 
standards. At the same time, the rights of host countries are strengthened. Most 
importantly, the evolution of the US essential security clause strongly suggests that (1) 
each party to an investment agreement that contains language along the lines of the 2004 
US Model BIT can judge for itself whether or not an essential security situation exists, 
creating the highly unusual situation of making a potential respondent government the 
judge in its own case; and (2) if the government decides that such a situation exists, it 
appears to be free to put aside its investment-treaty obligations in order to protect its 
                                                                                                                                                 
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 
2006), Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/01/3, Award (May 
22, 2007), Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, P 391, Sept. 28, 
2007, and Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008). 
See also the annulment decisions in Sempra, annulled by Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, decision on the Argentine Republic’s application for annulment of the award (June 29, 2010); 
Enron, annulled by Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, 
decision on the application for annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010); and CMS 
Transmission, annulment declined by CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine Republic 
(Sept. 25, 2007).  For a discussion, see José E. Alvarez and Tegan Brink, “Revisiting the necessity defense: 
Continental Casualty v. Argentina,” in International Investment Yearbook 2010-2011, op. cit., and Alberto 
Alvarez-Jimenez, “The interpretation of necessity clauses in bilateral investment treaties after the recent 
ICSID annulment decisions,” in ibid. 
104 Article 18 of the US Model BIT reads: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 1. to require a Party to 
furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its 
essential security interests; or 2. to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for 
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” 
105 2004 United States-Uruguay BIT, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Americas/South_America/Uruguay_BIT/asset_upload_file582_
6728.pdf. Article 18(2) says, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed…to preclude a Party from applying 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” 
106 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html. Article 
22.2(b) says, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed…to preclude a Party from applying measures that it 
considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” 





security (however defined). Alvarez put the implications of this approach as follows: “If 
this is what the new essential security clause in US BITs does, it would appear that the 
principal benefit of such treaties – to provide foreign investors with a forum capable of 
enforcing their claims and thereby secure a binding judgment against a host state – has 
been eviscerated.”108 In other words, an essential security (or similar) clause that is self-
judging, with “essential security” not defined, dramatically re-establishes the rights of 
host countries over investors (at least, presumably, in circumstances that are not ordinary; 
but this is for the host country to judge) in the case of parties to IIAs that follow this 
approach. If indeed other countries adopt this approach as well (and there is some 
indication that this is the case109), then a central pillar of the edifice of the international 
investment law and policy regime is in jeopardy. 
 
ii. The responsibilities of host countries and MNEs 
 
While the struggle of balancing the rights of host countries and MNEs is beginning to 
shift the balance toward the former, the situation has changed little in the area of 
responsibilities, at least as far as investors are concerned. To be sure, to the extent that the 
rights of MNEs are circumscribed and host country governments recover certain rights in 
                                                 
108 José E. Alvarez, “The rise of emerging market multinationals: legal challenges ahead,” in Foreign 
Direct Investments from Emerging Markets, op. cit.  Elsewhere, however, Alvarez observed: “The relevant 
case law does not suggest … that the invocation of ‘national security’ functions like a ‘get out of jail free’ 
card enabling host governments to take whatever actions they wish vis-à-vis foreign investors, including 
investors that are state owned.  Since many, if not most, of the gravest conflicts in history between foreign 
investors and their host countries have emerged in the midst of serious economic or political turmoil, it 
would be a serious departure from the existing legal regime governing investments if this were otherwise.” 
See his “Sovereign concerns”, in Sauvant, Sachs and Schmit Jongbloed, op. cit. There are of course a 
number of questions that arise. For example, there is the question of whether, in the case of a dispute 
involving a country that has a BIT with a self-judging essential security clause with one country and 
another BIT with an other country that does not contain such a clause (or contains such a clause, but 
without it being self-judging), the latter BIT (which is more favorable to investors) would trump the former 
(assuming that MFN applies). Another question is whether, even in the case that an essential security clause 
applies, compensation needs to be paid. To deal with such issues, it is not inconceivable that future BITs 
may contain a clarification to the effect, for example, that, for greater clarity, the invocation of the essential 
security clause does not give rise to any claims of compensation. 
109 The 2008 Japan-Laos BIT, for example, specifies that “…each Contracting Party may: (a) take any 
measure which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests; (i) taken in time of 
war, or armed conflict, or other emergency in that Contracting Party or in international relations; or (ii) 
relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting the non-
proliferation of weapons;…”. (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/treaty/submit/session169/agree-5.html) 
Similar provisions are contained in the Japan-Peru BIT, signed November 2008 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/agree0811.pdf) and Japan-Uzbekistan BIT, signed August 2008 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/treaty/submit/session170/agree-1.html). The 2005 India-Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement provides in Art. 6.12 (4): “This Article shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the Parties on non-justiciability of security exceptions 
as set out in their exchange of letters, which shall form an integral part of this Agreement”. The exchange 
of letters specifies that “any decision of the disputing Party taken on such security considerations shall be 
non-justiciable in that it shall not be open to any arbitral assessment of any claim for damages and/or 
compensation, or an adjudication of any other issue referred to the tribunal.” See also Article 24(3) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty and Art. 18 of the “ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement,” signed 
February 26, 2009. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement will enter into force after 





terms of the flexibility they have to pursue legitimate public policies, the responsibilities 
of host country governments are tempered. Overall, however, the responsibility of host 
countries remains to provide a secure, predictable and stable regulatory framework, and 
to protect investors, subject to the rule of law. 
 
There are also some signs that, after the lull of the mid-1980s to early-2000s, when the 
protection and the facilitation of entry and operation of investors reigned supreme, efforts 
to define the responsibilities of MNEs are receiving more attention, even if this is done 
mostly in the framework of voluntary instruments and in a fragmented manner. At the 
firm level, the concepts of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) and “sustainable 
development” have received widespread attention, and firms seek to incorporate them 
into their business activities on a voluntary basis. These efforts also have their 
international counterparts, with most of them focusing on social, human rights, 
environmental, and corruption issues; economic growth and development issues per se 
(of great interest to many countries), however, typically receive little attention. A few of 
these (and other) efforts have resulted in binding instruments, such as the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions110 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,111 or in 
commitments in various international agreements112 on specific subjects.113  
 
Most of the instruments dealing with the responsibilities of investors are voluntary. This 
is exemplified by the Global Compact (announced in 1999 by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, and launched in July 2000)114 and the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (2002).115 In the area of human rights and MNEs, the UN 
Secretary-General appointed a “Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
                                                 
110 OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, signed on December 17, 1997, entered into force on February 15, 1999. 
111 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted by G.A. res. 58/4 on October 31, 2003, entered 
into force on December 14, 2005. 
112 For example, the TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1994)) contains rules on certain restrictive business practices related to licensing contracts; see 
Pedro Roffe, “Control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses under the TRIPS Agreement”, in 
C. Correa and A.A. Usuf, eds., Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 
(London: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 261-296. The TRIPS Agreement also stipulates (art. 66.2) that “developed 
country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose 
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed country Members in order to enable 
them to create a sound and viable technological base.” 
113 There is also the possibility to link voluntary instruments to legally binding ones. At one point during 
the negotiations of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, it was proposed to annex the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the Agreement, without however changing their voluntary 
character. 
114 United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. As of June 30, 2009, the Global 
Compact has 8,000 participants, including over 5,300 businesses in 130 countries. 
115 The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative is a “coalition of governments, companies, civil society 
groups, investors and international organizations.” See http://www.eiti.org/ According to EITI’s website, 50  
of the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies “support and actively participate in the EITI process.” 






issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises,” John 
Ruggie, to, among other things, “elaborate further on the scope and content of the 
corporate responsibility to respect all human rights and to provide concrete guidance to 
business and other stakeholders,” and to “identify, exchange and promote best practices 
and lessons learned on the issue of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, in coordination with the efforts of the human rights working group of the 
Global Compact.”116 Of special significance are the “Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices” (the “Santiago Principles”), presented by the IMF’s International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) to the IMF’s International Monetary and 
Financial Committee on October 11, 2008117 to govern the behavior of a special class of 
foreign investors, namely sovereign wealth funds. The Santiago Principles too are 
voluntary, but the speed with which they were formulated indicates what can be done if 
major countries decide that action needs to be taken. 
 
Voluntary instruments like the ones mentioned can play a useful role in terms of learning, 
outlining and establishing standards, defining expectations, and influencing behavior. As 
such, they raise the responsibilities of MNEs, especially when such soft-law instruments 
are considered in judicial proceedings and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
others monitor the resulting instruments.118 Monitoring is particularly important to lend 
credibility to voluntary instruments.  It continues to be undertaken in regard to long-
established instruments such as, most notably, the ILO Tripartite Declaration119 and the 
OECD Guidelines.120 The OECD Guidelines were strengthened in 2000;121 it is expected 
                                                 
116 “Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises,” Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, June 18, 2008, 
available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf. For the full terms of 
reference and a complete list of documents prepared by and submitted to the Special Representative as 
of August 10, 2010 (including links to the documents), see http://www.business-
humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home (last visited March 16, 2011).  
117 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices,‘Santiago Principles’ (October 2008).  The IWG agreed to 
explore the creation of a standing group of SWFs to keep the principles and practices under review and 
facilitate their dissemination, proper understanding and implementation. A “Formation Committee,” 
comprised of 10 IWG members has been established, on a voluntary basis, to discuss and draw up the 
charter and work program of the proposed standing group. The work is in progress, and the IMF continues 
to facilitate it until the new group is established and becomes functional.To facilitate and to follow up on 
the work undertaken in the context of the Santiago Principles, the IWG established  (by the “Kuwait 
Declaration” of April 6, 2009)  the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Forum is a 
voluntary group of SWFs for the purpose of meeting and exchanging views on issues of common interest, 
and to facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF activities. It was emphasized that the 
Forum is not to be a formal supranational authority and its work shall not carry any legal force. The Forum 
has a professional Secretariat to facilitate its activities and direct communications. The Forum has 
requested the IMF staff to initially undertake this role. See http://www.iwg-
swf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm#P39_6108 and http://www.ifswf.org/. 
118 NGOs monitor in particular various industry codes. 
119 International Labour Office, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, fourth edition (2006), available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/declaration2006.pdf.  
120 The decision of the Council underlying the guidelines states, for example, that “The Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises …shall periodically or at the request of an adhering 





that an update of the Guidelines (launched in 2010) will be completed in mid-2011,122 
reflecting presumably the changing approach toward FDI, at least to a certain extent. 
 
Overall, the most one can say is that the definition of the responsibilities of MNEs is 
inching toward more binding commitments, even if in a fragmented manner. The issue 
remains, therefore, whether the responsibilities of MNEs as currently defined and 
contained in overwhelmingly voluntary instruments are commensurate with the rights 
these enterprises enjoy and the role they play in the world economy and individual 
countries. In the new climate of re-evaluating the costs and benefits of certain forms of 
FDI and the new assertiveness of host countries, it may well be that this issue will receive 
more attention in the future. 
 
5. The way forward 
 
The establishment of an international regulatory framework for MNEs was described, at 
the beginning of this chapter, as involving a struggle to find the proper balance between 
the rights and responsibilities of MNEs on the one hand and those of host countries on the 
other, and a struggle over the legal nature (mandatory vs. voluntary) that any rights and 
responsibilities should take, based on the overall recognition that the global nature of the 
activities of MNEs requires an international approach.  The preceding discussion has 
shown that the answer to this challenge has varied over time, depending on how 
governments perceived the cost and benefits associated with FDI and hence what 
attitudes they adopted and what objectives they pursued.  
 
The struggle to reach the proper balance continues and needs to continue. Four areas, in 
particular, deserve attention: 
 
1. Further clarification of the substantive rights and responsibilities of host country 
governments. As discussed, the present international investment law and policy regime 
has been established primarily and purposefully to protect foreign direct investors and 
facilitate their operations. The regime needs to evolve further in a manner that it also 
recognizes clearly the right of host countries to regulate in the public interest in order to 
protect and further their own legitimate public policy objectives, particularly as regards 
their own security and development. At the same time, the responsibilities of host 
countries need to be clear as well, i.e., the right to regulate in the public interest needs to 
                                                                                                                                                 
application;” “The Committee shall be responsible for clarification of the Guidelines;” and “The 
Committee shall hold exchanges of views on the activities of National Contact Points with a view to 
enhancing the effectiveness of the Guidelines.” See OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Decision of the Council (June 2000), available at:  
121 For documents related to this revision, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2439005_1_1_1_1,00.html. The revised 
Guidelines included recommendations on the elimination of child labor, forced labor and human rights, 
new chapters on corruption and consumer protection, revised sections on the environment and on 
transparency and disclosure, and improved implementation procedures. 
122 See OECD, “Building trust and confidence in international investment” (Paris: OECD, March 26, 2009), 
mimeo. See also “Adhering countries will discuss the draft updated text at meetings in February and March 






be circumscribed in a manner that it does not provide the pretext for governments—
whether of developed countries or emerging markets – to disregard their international 
commitments. Efforts need to be made, in particular, to clarify and, if need be, 
circumscribe, the self-judging essential security clause – it is a basic tenet of law that one 
cannot be a judge in one’s own case.123 This is even more important at a time when FDI 
protectionism appears to be on the rise, accompanied by the re-appearance of screening 
mechanisms along the lines of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US. A good 
part of it appears to be directed against MNEs from emerging markets, or at least certain 
emerging markets and certain types of investments, namely sovereign FDI in the form of 
M&As. This development deserves special attention as MNEs from emerging markets, 
like their counterparts from developed countries, need a regulatory framework that is 
secure, predictable and stable, protects investors and assures the rule of law. An FDI 
Protectionism Observatory may be needed to monitor this development and focus 
international attention on it. 
 
Progress in balancing the regulatory framework for investment has been made, in that the 
substantive rights of investors have been more clearly defined and at times even 
circumscribed, and in that at least some IIAs show more respect for the substantive rights 
of host countries. The evolution of the US approach is particularly important here, as the 
changes made between the country’s 1984 and 2004 Model BIT and the country’s IIAs 
that are based on the latter indicate how the balancing can be done. Among the many 
ways in which the U.S. has become more cautious about granting protections to foreign 
investors, particularly important is the limitation of the (absolute) “fair and equitable 
treatment” standard, which shifts the focus back to the (relative) “national treatment” 
standard, combined with more freedom to take exceptions from that standard; this puts 
non-discrimination back into the heart of the treatment approach.124 Important is also the 
limitation of an expansive interpretation of investors’ rights in the area of indirect 
expropriation, especially by apparently making non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
non-compensable.125 The Zeitgeist may even move the US approach further on a number 
of other key issues in IIAs. Thus, the May 2009 Hearings of the Ways and Means Trade 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives of the US Congress focused on 
investment protections included in US BITs and free trade agreements, asking “whether 
our FTAs and BITs give foreign investors in the United States greater rights than U.S. 
investors have under US law; whether the FTAs and BITs give governments the 
‘regulatory and policy space’ needed to protect the environment and the public welfare; 
and whether an investor should have the right to submit to arbitration a claim that a host 
                                                 
123 For a strong case against self-judging clauses, see for example Peter Muchlinski, “Trends in 
international investment agreements: balancing investor rights and the right to regulate. The issue of 
national security”, in International Investment Yearbook 2008-2009, op. cit., pp. 35-78. See also Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, “Economic security defenses in international investment law”, ibid., pp. 479-504. 
124 On national treatment as one of the core guarantees, see e.g. Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (Leiden and Boston: Brill Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 
125 Related to this is the calculation of compensation in case of expropriation and the question of what 
approach to take in this respect. While the formula “prompt, adequate and effective” seems to be widely 
accepted, there does not seem to be a generally accepted approach to the calculation of damages, e.g., to 
what extent lost potential earnings should be taken into account. See, e.g. Stiglitz, op. cit., arguing that 





government has breached its investment obligations under an FTA or a BIT.”126 What 
these questions imply is whether the U.S. should consider subscribing to the Calvo 
doctrine (once advocated by Latin American countries);127 whether host country rights 
should be strengthened further (the concept of “policy space” is a concept that has 
traditionally been used by developing countries in the WTO either to avoid taking on 
certain international obligations or to obtain more flexibility in applying existing rules); 
and whether investor-state dispute settlement should perhaps be phased out in favor of 
State-State dispute settlement (as in the WTO). It may well be that the review of the US 
model BIT that has been initiated will further strengthen the rights of host countries.128 
 
Recent US and Canadian IIAs reflect the evolving balance as regards host country rights 
and responsibilities. The inclusion of clauses that allow the parties to issue binding 
interpretations of the treaties they have entered into provide the basis on which further 
changes can be made if and when parties to IIAs containing such clauses decide to make 
use of them. Other countries are likely to adopt the US and Canadian approach, or at least 
elements of it,129 contributing in this manner potentially to an overall rebalancing of the 
regime. 
 
One provision that also changed in the 2004 US Model BIT compared to the 1984 
version is that it expanded pre-establishment national treatment rights. This is one of the 
most sensitive issues and difficult rights, especially for developing countries, as it 
involves the right of establishment. (The difficulty of this right is reflected in the fact 
that, even among developed countries, it was granted only in 1984.130) It is particularly 
difficult for developing countries because economic development, and with it the 
                                                 
126 Hearing on Investment Protections in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements, United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, May 14, 2009, 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=678. For a strong reaction against 
the answers perhaps implied in these questions, see Daniel M. Price, “Keep international protections,” 
Washington Times, May 14, 2009. As to the first of these questions, it should be noted that President 
Obama had stated during the Presidential campaign that he is opposed to “granting foreign investors any 
rights in the U.S. greater than those of Americans.” See Barack Obama for President, A Blueprint for 
Change, Strengthening the economy:  Trade, 13, available at http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ (viewed 
August 24, 2008). The final report on the hearings is available at 
is: http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/adcom/aciep/rls/index.htm. 
127 According to this doctrine, aliens have no more rights than the citizens of a sovereign state. 
Accordingly, investor-State disputes need to be settled under domestic law by the courts of the countries 
involved. Interestingly, in at least one country, Ghana, an opposite development seems to be taking place. 
According to Section 29 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Center Act, 1994, Act 478 (contained in the 
Revised Statute Laws of Ghana, 2007) (which applies to enterprises other than petroleum and mining 
enterprises), it appears that a domestic investor may be able to refer a dispute with the Government to 
international arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL or any other national or international machinery for 
the settlement of investment dispute agreed to by the parties. In fact, where there is disagreement between 
an investor and the Government as to the method of dispute settlement to be adopted, the choice of the 
investor shall prevail 
(http://www.gipc.org.gh/UploadFiles/Publications/Investment_Law070627114453.pdf) I am grateful to 
S.K.B. Asante for this information. 
128 As of March 2011, the new US Model BIT had not been released. 
129 Reference was already made earlier to the inclusion of a self-judging essential security clause in the case 
of recent Japan BITs and other treaties. 





establishment or strengthening of domestic industries and firms, is of paramount 
importance for these countries; infant-industry, national champion (also not unknown to 
developed countries) and industrial policy considerations (as well as considerations 
related to strategic sectors) require that governments retain the right to admit foreign 
investors on the basis of their domestic law and regulations. Not too many countries 
include a provision on national treatment at the pre-establishment phase in their IIAs, so 
that, given the current overall attitude toward FDI, this approach may not become the 
norm in such agreements.131 
 
2. Further clarification of the responsibilities of MNEs. While there has been a 
movement toward the greater recognition of the rights of host countries, little has 
changed regarding the responsibilities of MNEs. The responsibilities of these firms, be it 
from developed countries or emerging markets,132 need to be defined in a clearer and 
more coherent manner, as this is an important aspect of the overall balance of the 
international investment law and policy regime. This is in tune with the recognition that 
enterprises have a responsibility to their stakeholders in the communities in which they 
are established and play an important role. Attitudes in this respect are also changing, as 
reflected in the wide-spread acceptance of the concept of corporate social responsibility, 
further encouraged by the recent financial and economic crises and the attendant possible 
changing balance between the role of the state vs. the role of the market in the 
management of economic matters.  
 
Further work can build on the various efforts already undertaken, although there is a 
question as to which issues should be addressed. For NGOs and governments in 
developed countries, the priority is often to address issues related to human rights, the 
environment, the social sphere, and corruption (as, for example, reflected in the Global 
Compact). For developing countries, the priority is often to address issues that are more 
directly related to economic development, such as transfer of technology and taxation. Be 
that as it may, the broader question of voluntary vs. mandatory still remains. But even if 
standards for MNEs are voluntary, there can be mandatory procedural obligations for 
governments to encourage MNEs to comply with such standards, as is the case with the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, an approach that could conceivably find 
its way into IIAs. In fact, the proposed Norwegian Model BIT (2007) took this approach. 
Article 32 stated: “The Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment 
activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to 
participate in the United Nations Global Compact.”133 Conceivably, such an approach (in 
                                                 
131 Arguably, with the review, by certain countries, of incoming M&As under national security 
considerations, national treatment at the pre-establishment phase for one class of investments (M&As) is 
weakened (although, as noted earlier, the great majority of such M&As is not being reviewed). 
132 Or, for that matter, of domestic firms as well, to avoid discrimination.  
133 Norway’s draft Model BIT (2007) is available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc. 
According to Investment Treaty News, June 2009, p. 7, however, Norway shelved the model BIT as public 
feedback indicated that, for some, the model did not provide investors with sufficient protection, while, for 
others, it did not give the government sufficient policy space to regulate in the public interest. For a 





similar or stronger language) can be extended to other voluntary instruments. The EU-
ACP Cotonou Agreement, for example, contains references to sustainable development 
and human rights.134 Finally, MNEs are subject to the laws and regulations of the 
countries in which they operate. To the extent to which these countries have laws and 
regulations that prescribe particular corporate behavior, foreign investors are bound by 
them; moreover, to the extent that IIAs prescribe that treaty benefits are granted only to 
investments made in accordance with host country laws and regulations,135 MNEs 
wishing to benefit from a treaty’s coverage need to observe national corporate standards 
as well, for that reason alone. Finally, in the case of large projects, most notably in 
natural resources and infrastructure, contracts are often concluded between governments 
(or government entities) and foreign investors, and these contracts can contain obligations 
addressed to the investors. In case of an alleged material breach of such an obligation, 
domestic courts -- or, depending on a contract’s provision, international arbitration – can 
resolve such claims.136 In other words, there are a number of avenues through which the 
responsibilities of MNEs can be clarified. 
 
3. Further clarification of the responsibilities of home countries. To a large extent, home 
country governments in their capacity as home country governments see their 
responsibilities regarding outward investment restricted to protecting such investment 
and facilitating the international operations of their firms in host countries, as reflected in 
the conclusion of IIAs. But beyond that, most IIAs contain only very limited 
responsibilities for home countries, even though the investment relationship involves at 
least three parties: MNEs, host countries and home countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the model bilateral investment treaties of Norway, South Africa and the United States”, in International 
Investment Yearbook 2009-2010, op cit, pp. 41-86. 
134 “Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
and the European Community and Its Member States” (“The Cotonou Agreement”), June 23, 2000, revised 
June 2005, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22000A1215(01):EN:NOT.  For a discussion, see 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W.  Gehring and Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development in 
World Investment Law (Alphen: Kluwer, 2011); see also Ilze Dubava, “ Reconciling international 
investment law and sustainable development: Necessity or luxury?” (Florence: European University 
Institute, 2011), mimeo. 
135 Which could include obligations arising out of other international instruments (e.g., on human rights, 
social and environmental issues), to the extent that they have acquired effect in national law. 
136 If governments could evoke an appropriately drafted umbrella clause in reference to obligations of 
foreign investors in state contracts (and perhaps even other contracts), the umbrella clause could have the 
effect of bringing such contracts under treaty protection. (IIAs themselves typically do not impose 
obligations on foreign investors, although, as discussed earlier, some are beginning to do so.) For that, 
however, IIAs would have to contain provisions that allow governments not only to file counter-claims but 
also to initiate arbitration – a right they typically do not have. Access to international arbitration for 
governments is, therefore, an option that needs to be explored (even though, in the absence of such a right, 
it is possible that arbitrators will take into account a possible violation of a contract by an investor when 
calculating damages). One possible approach to this issue has been suggested by Ucheora Onwuamaegbu: 
As part of the conditions for entry, host countries could require that investors, to qualify for the protection 
of the treaty, need to give their consent that they accept international arbitration in case of a dispute brought 





Arguably, especially BITs – whose full title is often a variation of “treaties for the 
promotion and protection of investment” – could provide for more active steps to 
promote outward FDI, especially into developing and especially the 50 least developed 
countries. In fact, virtually all developed countries do take a number of active steps in 
this respect, ranging from providing insurance to their outward investors, to making 
financing available (e.g. for feasibility studies), to granting fiscal incentives,137 to 
providing information on investment opportunities.138 All these measures are useful, and 
they reflect the conviction of home countries that they benefit from helping their firms to 
develop an international portfolio of locational assets as an important source of their 
firms’ competitiveness.139 But such measures are taken only at the discretion of the 
individual home country and to serve primarily only its own interests, i.e., they are not 
the results of negotiations and taken because they are prescribed by IIAs (in the same 
manner in which the responsibilities of host countries are).140 
 
A more balanced international investment law and policy regime could include 
responsibilities for home countries (at least for developed countries and advanced 
developing countries) to encourage and facilitate FDI flows to the least developed 
countries, focusing especially on investments that have the most favorable development 
impact. Such commitments could enshrine a number of the measures taken so far 
unilaterally. They could also extend to providing support to strengthening the institutional 
capacity of developing countries to attract FDI and benefit from it, and they could extend 
to supporting the negotiation and implementation of IIAs and dealing with investment 
disputes.141 Conceivably, commitments of this type could also include efforts by home 
country governments to require from “their” MNEs the observance of certain standards of 
behavior, as was done, for example, during the apartheid era when U.S. and European 
                                                 
137 See, for example, the debate in the US regarding the favorable tax-treatment of non-repatriated earnings 
by MNEs. 
138 For a full discussion of measures that could be taken by home countries, see “Home country measures”, 
in Karl P. Sauvant and Joerg Weber, eds., International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2005), vol III., pp. 1-28. 
139 The underlying assumption is, grosso modo, that, what is good for a country’s MNEs is also good for 
the (home) country. To the extent, however, that MNEs become truly multinational in terms of the location 
of their assets and activities, this assumption may hold less and less. See in this context the debate between 
Robert Reich and Laura Tyson which, although held 20 years ago is, if anything, even more relevant today. 
See Robert Reich, "Who is us?", Harvard Business Review, 1990, pp. 53-64; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "They 
are not us: Why American ownership still matters", The American Prospect, 1991, pp. 37-48; and Robert 
Reich, "Who do we think they are?", The American Prospect, 1991, pp. 49-53. 
140 While all developed countries have a policy to protect and promote outward FDI by “their” companies, 
and have various programs in place to this effect, few developing countries have such policies and 
programs. Notable exceptions include China (which is supporting its firms to “go global”) and Singapore, 
which seeks to develop an external wing of its economy through outward FDI. See UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 1995: Transnational Corporations and Competitiveness (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1995), ch. 
VII; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Implications for Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2006); Peter J. Buckley, Jeremy L. Clegg, Adam R. 
Cross and Hinrich Voss, “What can emerging countries learn from the outward direct investment policies 
of advanced countries?” in, Foreign Direct Investments from Emerging Markets, op. cit; and Filip De Beule 
and Daniel Van Den Bulcke, “Changing policy regimes in outward foreign direct investment: from control 
to promotion,” in ibid.  





Union MNEs were obliged to observe certain guidelines when operating in South 
Africa.142 All or any of such commitments could be accompanied by monitoring and 
follow-up mechanisms. 
 
4. Further clarification of the dispute-settlement process. International investor-State 
dispute settlement is an integral part of the international investment law and policy 
regime, a part that gives the regime the “teeth” that many other international regimes do 
not have. It is also special because it gives foreign investors – be they from developed or 
developing countries -- access to an international dispute-settlement mechanism, a 
privilege that domestic firms do not have as a rule. It is therefore particularly important 
that the judicial process associated with the dispute-settlement mechanism works 
properly and is seen as fair and legitimate by the regime’s principal stakeholders. Several 
aspects deserve special attention.143  
 
Given the absence of an authoritative and clearly defined instrument governing 
investment matters, the rapid development of the investment regime and the evolving 
nature of its substantive provisions, arbitral tribunals have acquired substantial leeway to 
interpret treaty language. Equally, it is not surprising that, eventually, efforts were made 
to reduce the discretion of such tribunals. According to Kenneth J. Vandevelde, in fact, it 
was precisely one of the objectives of the 2004 US Model BIT to do that “by clarifying 
the substantive provisions of the BIT, so as to provide clearer guidance to the tribunals, 
and by allowing the two BIT parties to determine certain issues for the tribunals”.144 
Reference has already been made to the clarification of some substantive provisions. As 
to the question of guidance, the 2004 US Model allows the BIT parties, most importantly, 
to issue joint interpretations of BIT provisions that are binding on a tribunal. To the 
extent that BITs do not contain a provision for interpretation, it could be included if the 
parties so desire, either during renegotiations of expiring BITs (and a number of these 
treaties are being renegotiated or are coming up for renegotiation145 since  a great number 
of them were negotiated during the 1990s and have a ten-year duration) or through the 
                                                 
142 See The Global Sullivan Principles, available at: 
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp and Code of Conduct for European 
Community Companies with Subsidiaries, Branches or Representation in South Africa, 19 Nov. 1985, 
reprinted in 24 ILM 1477 (1985). 
143 Other issues that deserve attention, but are not further elaborated here, include access to international 
arbitration at the initiative of host countries; access by host countries to the courts of home countries in case 
of disputes even if such access is not provided for in contracts (in principle, home country governments 
could grant access to their courts in IIAs to which they are party); possible abuses through treaty shopping; 
the selection of arbitrators and conflicts of interest; improvements of transparency, and admission of 
amicus briefs from non-disputing parties. For a review, see, e.g., van Harten, op. cit., and Stiglitz, op. cit. 
Wälde summarizes the criticisms against investment arbitration as follows in his “Improving the 
mechanisms for treaty negotiation and investment disputes”, op. cit., pp. 511-512: “fragmentation of 
adjudication, lack of central unifying judicial authority, inconsistency of judicial law-making, integrity of 
process and players, transparency, access to third parties, operating in treaty systems with stunted 
compliance mechanisms”. 
144 Vandevelde, “A comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs”, op. cit., pp. 283-316. 
145 See, Edward Kehoe and Paul Maslo, “Trends in international investment agreements 2009-2010: 





changing of existing treaties; in this manner, treaty partners can see to it that the 
application of a treaty corresponds to their objectives. 
 
This possibility, however, does not alleviate the need to deal with the possibility of 
inconsistent decisions rendered by autonomous ad hoc tribunals responding to similar or 
even the same facts.146 In the case of the U.S., the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of the US Congress147 prescribed therefore for the country’s free trade 
agreements a negotiating objective of “providing for an appellate body or similar 
mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade 
agreements”.148 As mentioned earlier, the call for an appellate body or similar mechanism 
to review awards rendered by tribunals was subsequently included in the 2004 US Model 
BIT and incorporated in US IIAs.149 What this means is that the issue is on the agenda, 
although increasing coherence and consistency in international investment adjudication 
might eventually require a multilateral appeals mechanism, if not a World Investment 
Court with full-time independent judges.150 
 
Another important aspect of the dispute-settlement process concerns the capacity of all 
States to participate in this process equally and competently. This challenge is well 
known from the trade area. There it led, in 2001, to the establishment of the 
(intergovernmental) Advisory Center on WTO Law to assist its members (primarily 
smaller developing countries) in dealing with the rapidly increasing number of disputes 
arising in the WTO, with a view toward ensuring that they can benefit fairly from the 
international trade system and, in this manner, strengthen the legitimacy of the system 
itself.151 The situation in the investment area today is similar, given the rapid rise in the 
number of international investment disputes and the complexity and rapidly evolving 
                                                 
146 See e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (13 September 2001), 
(http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf) and Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award 
(3 September 2001) (http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf). For a discussion of the pros and 
cons of such a mechanism, see Sauvant with Chiswick-Patterson, op. cit., 
147 See Barton Legum, “Options to establish an appellate mechanism for investment disputes,” in ibid., p. 
232. 
148 19 U.S.C. para. 3802(b) (3) (G) (iv). 
149 An initiative by ICSID, starting in October 2004, to create an “Appeals Facility” did not gain traction. 
After consultations, an ICSID document reported in May 2005 that most members of the Administrative 
Council had concluded that “it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this 
stage, particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues” involved; see ICSID, “Suggested 
changes to the ICSID rules and regulations 3”, May 12, 2005, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf.  
150 As advocated, for example, by van Harten and Stiglitz. See, respectively, van Harten, op. cit., and 
Stiglitz, op. cit. For a critical review arriving at the conclusion that the prospects of a unitary appellate 
mechanism are dim, at least in the near-term, see Legum, op. cit, pp. 231-240. Similarly Wälde, op. cit. as 
regards a World Investment Court. 
151 The Centre’s website (http://www.acwl.ch/e/index_e.aspx) says: “The Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
(ACWL) is a Geneva-based intergovernmental organisation that was established in 2001 to provide legal 
advice on WTO law, support in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and training in WTO law to 
developing countries and least developed countries (‘LDCs’). The terms ‘country’ and ‘developing 
country’ include customs territories and countries with economies in transition. The ACWL's basic mission 
is to ensure that these Members of the WTO have a full understanding of their rights and obligations under 





international investment law and policy regime. Many countries, especially developing 
ones, simply do not have the resources152 to keep up with these developments, be it to 
negotiate state-of-the-art IIAs or defend themselves adequately in international 
investment disputes. For this reason, it would be appropriate to establish an independent 
intergovernmental International Investment Law Advisory Center to help its members in 
matters related to international investment law; the idea is actively being pursued in Latin 
America (a region particularly exposed to international investment disputes).153 The terms 
of reference of such a facility could conceivably range from making available 
information and arranging for the sharing of experiences; to providing training and 
technical assistance in matters related to the negotiation of IIAs and their implementation; 
to the promotion of alternative means of dispute settlement; to assistance in the technical 
preparation of governments in the event of disputes; to rendering legal opinions; to 
litigating on behalf of a government. A competent Advisory Center would help ensure 
that there is a level playing field allowing for a fair dispute-settlement process; it would 
therefore enhance the acceptability -- and with that the legitimacy -- of the international 




Many of these (and other) shortcomings of the international law and policy regime are the 
result of its expansion during a period when the focus was almost exclusively on the 
responsibility of host countries, as well as the speed with which the regime developed 
over the past 20 years or so. The rebalancing that is underway and the various 
improvements that are being discussed or have been proposed will help to rectify this 
situation, and hence need to be pursued vigorously. It is in fact noteworthy that few, if 
any,154 question the need for an international regime as such, to deal with issues arising 
                                                 
152 There is also the question of whether governments that face no or few disputes should (and can) allocate 
scarce resources to building up a first class capacity for the event that they face a dispute, instead of using 
these resources for other purposes.  
153 The idea of establishing such a facility emerged in UNCTAD in 2005 and was later that year suggested 
to the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) where a 
number of members expressed interest in it. Subsequently, the Inter-American Development Bank, at the 
request of several Latin American governments, launched a project together with UNCTAD, the 
Organization of American States, the Academia de Centroamerica (Costa Rica), and the Vale Columbia 
Center on Sustainable International Investment (Columbia University) to explore the feasibility of an 
advisory facility for developing countries from the Latin American region. See UNCTAD, “Consultation 
report on the feasibility of an advisory facility on international investment law and investor-State disputes 
for Latin American countries” (Geneva: UNCTAD, February 2, 2009), mimeo. Negotiations among 
interested Latin American and Caribbean countries commenced in May 2009. On the question of such a 
facility in general, see Eric Gottwald, “Leveling the playing field: is it time for a legal assistance center for 
developing nations in investment treaty arbitration?”, American University International Law Review, vol. 
22 (2007), pp. 237-275, and Wälde, “Improving the mechanisms for treaty negotiation and investment 
disputes”, op. cit. 563, for whom the “lack of a legal aid facility … is … a serious deficiency of the overall 
investment arbitration regime.” In Latin America, UNASUR has also been pursuing the idea of an advisory 
facility. 
154 Even an eminent and ardent critic of the present international investment law and policy regime like 
Sornarajah does not per se question the need of such a regime to deal with the trans-border investments of 





from the trans-border investments of firms. Rather, what scholars advocate is either that 
the regime requires fundamental changes,155 major adjustments156 or merely has to go 
through a “crise de croissance -- a teenager’s crisis”,157 with most others seeing only a 
limited need for improvements. 
 
On this basis, it would be desirable to take stock of where we stand in the evolution of the 
investment regime. At least two approaches offer themselves to do that. The first one 
would be to prepare a ”Restatement of International Investment Law” to determine what 
is “black letter” law, where there is no consensus, and what the legal implications are of 
various provisions. Such a Restatement would, at a minimum, establish what is the lowest 
common denominator in the area of international investment law. The second approach 
would be the preparation of a model BIT – which, like any model treaty, would be an 
ideal type -- to identify (perhaps with options and legal implications) what could be the 
desirable content of any treaty (or the investment chapters in free trade agreements) of 
this kind, built on best practice; a model BIT could be of particular interest to developing 
countries.158 In either case, the credibility of the resulting text would depend entirely on 
the reputation and representativeness of the scholars preparing the texts. An authoritative 
Restatement and model BIT, in turn, could serve as guides for arbitrators and negotiators 
of investment agreements.  
 
In the meantime, the developments that deserve most attention concern the U.S. and 
emerging markets as they are likely to influence most the direction in which the 
international investment regime may evolve. (With the Lisbon Treaty159 giving 
competence to the Commission of the European Communities in the investment area, the 
Commission could also become an important player once it has been settled how it 
should proceed.160) As to the US, what needs to be watched is the country’s further treaty-
                                                                                                                                                 
normlessness: the ravages and retreat of neo-liberalism in international investment law”, in International 
Investment Yearbook 2009-2010, op cit, pp. 595-642. 
155 See, e.g. ibid.; M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, second edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); and M. Sornarajah, “A coming crisis: expansionary trends in 
investment treaty arbitration,” in Sauvant with Chiswick-Patterson, op. cit., pp. 39-80. 
156 See Howard Mann, “Civil society perspectives: what do key stakeholders expect from the international 
investment regime,” in Alvarez et al., op. cit., and Stiglitz, “Regulating multinational corporations,” op. cit. 
157 Brigitte Stern, “The future of international investment law: a balance between the protection of investors 
and the states’ capacity to regulate,” in Alvarez et al., op. cit., ch. 2.7. 
158 Many countries have their own model BITs, a number of them reprinted in UNCTAD, International 
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, op. cit. At the international level, the OECD had prepared (1967) 
a “Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property”; see OECD, Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, C(67)102 (1967), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf. Although this draft was not opened for signature, it 
became the model for many BITs initiated by developed countries. There are also the OECD and UN 
model tax treaties, op. cit., and there is the “IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development,” of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, a non-governmental 
organization. (Available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf). 
159 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (signed at Lisbon, December 13 2007, entered into force December 1, 2009), 2007/C 306/01, 
available at: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm 
160 See, European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 





making practice in light of the 2004 Model BIT and the review of that model in a climate 
much more respectful of host country interests.  
 
In the case of emerging markets, the growth of MNEs from those countries, and hence 
the increasing role of emerging markets as home countries, is bound to influence the 
further evolution of the investment regime, especially at a time of a changing investment 
climate and rising FDI protectionism.161 At the same time that developed countries, the 
traditional home countries, seek to reflect more their interests as host countries in IIAs, 
important emerging markets, whose outward FDI is rising fast and is becoming 
significant, seek to reflect more their new interests as home countries in such agreements; 
in particular, they seem to come to the conviction that their investors would benefit from 
the advantages of international investment law. Indicative of this is not only the inclusion 
of investor-State dispute settlement provisions in IIAs between and among emerging 
markets, but also the fact that emerging market MNEs are making more use of 
international arbitration, even if not as much as their developed country counterparts: Of 
the total of 357 known international arbitration cases at the end of 2009, about 10 percent 
were initiated by firms from emerging markets.162 While that percentage is not high, it is 
lower than the share of emerging markets in world FDI outflows. 
 
The two developments may well come together in the negotiations of a China-US BIT 
(or, in the future, a China-EU free trade agreement or BIT). The two countries agreed in 
July 2008 to negotiate such a treaty and, by the beginning of 2011, had held a number of 
meetings in this regard. The US is coming to these negotiations from a position in which 
it was a strong advocate of expansive investor protections but is moving toward 
circumscribing such protections while strengthening host country rights. China is coming 
to these negotiations from a position in which it was careful about protecting host country 
rights but is moving toward strengthening investor protections.163 To quote Stephan W. 
Schill, the new generation of China BITs (starting with the BIT with The Netherlands  
(2001) and Germany (2003)) “conform, despite some remaining limitations, in all major 
aspects to what can be considered standard treaty practice in approximately 2,500 BITs 
world-wide”, turning the country’s BITs “into effective and powerful tools of investment 
protection.”164 In the opinion of one observer, China’s approach to its BITs today is 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprehensive European international investment policy” (July 7, 2010), COM(2010) 343 def; and 
European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council –
establishing a transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and 
third countries” (July 7, 2010) COM(2010) 344 def; these two documents are reprinted in the  International 
Investment Yearbook 2010-2011, op. cit. See the same source for a discussion of a number of issues 
relating to the EU competency issue in the area of FDI. 
161 China was one of the countries that supported the inclusion of a reference to FDI protectionism in the 
G20 statements reported above. 
162 Data supplied by UNCTAD. 
163 China is the emerging market with the largest number of BITs (125), surpassed, worldwide, only by 
Germany (135), by the end of 2009. It should be noted that China’s outward FDI during 2008 almost 
doubled to US$ 52 billion (while world FDI flows declined) and remained at that level in 2009, when world 
FDI flows declined by over 40 percent. China’s outflows during those two years were equivalent to the 
average of world FDI flows during the first half of the 1980s. 
164 Stephan W. Schill, “Tearing down the Great Wall: the new generation investment treaties of the 





similar to the approach of the US during the 1980s, implying that it is more investor 
friendly (and less host-country friendly) than the US today.165 
 
It is far from certain, however, that a China-US BIT will be concluded, even though both 
countries have an interest in such a treaty: the US because the country’s firms have 
sizable investments in China, and the business community is supportive of such a treaty 
(including in the light of a perceived deterioration of the country’s investment climate);166 
China, because the country’s firms seek to expand into the US, but are faced (especially 
when they are State-controlled) with a more difficult environment.167 Still, substantial 
difficulties have to be overcome, most importantly the political climate in Washington, 
D.C., regarding IIAs in general and China in particular, and the inherent difficulties, in 
the best of circumstances, to reach agreement on a very difficult subject in a process in 
which neither country has an inherent negotiating advantage or even can dictate terms.168 
 
However, should agreement be reached and a treaty be ratified, it might well represent a 
“grand compromise” as it would involve a compromise between the single largest home  
and host country among developed countries on the one hand, and the single largest home 
and host country among developing countries, on the other. Such a compromise could 
well foreshadow the direction that the evolving international investment law and policy 
regime might take in terms of resolving, at least temporarily, the struggle to find the 
proper balance between the rights and responsibilities of MNEs on the one hand and 
those of countries on the other, and the struggle over the legal nature that any rights and 
responsibilities should take. In fact, even if and agreement can be reached, but ratification 
should not take place, the resulting text might still capture a new balance of rights and 
                                                                                                                                                 
76,77. See also Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
165 Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime”, op. cit.  
166 The heads of 30 US business organizations wrote, on July 21, 2008, to the President of the United States 
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167 See Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Investing in the United States: Is the US Ready for FDI from China? 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009).  
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ways to find a compromise, though. For example, perhaps a compromise could be formulated around 
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BIT (Art. II), which provides for entry and establishment, but makes it subject to the host country’s laws 
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the other Contracting Party pursuant to its applicable laws and regulations” – see Gallagher and Shan, op. 
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screening mechanism. Any compromise along these lines would also bring a China-US BIT closer to the 
approach of a number of European countries on this question, thus enhancing the potential of such a treaty 





responsibilities of investors and host countries and become a model for other countries to 
follow. 
 
“Temporarily”, because finding the proper balance regarding the rights and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders in the international investment law and policy regime 
is an ongoing struggle. In fact, particularly now, at the beginning of the 2010s, the 
international investment law and policy regime is very much in flux, given the various 
changes in the international economy (including the increasing importance of emerging 
markets as outward investors), and given the various developments that are taking place, 
including the negotiations between China on the one hand and Canada, Japan and the US 
on the other regarding their respective BITs; the possible reconsideration by Brazil 
concerning the desirability of the country concluding BITs;169 and the European 
Commission sorting out the precise content of its new competence in the investment area. 
In other words, we are in the middle of a dynamic process in which key actors are 
reassessing their interest situations and objectives, including in the light of changing 
attitudes vis-à-vis foreign direct investment and in the light of changing bargaining 
power. 
 
In the end, we might well have to transcend the combination of international investment 
agreements, customary international law, judicial decisions, authoritative statements, and 
voluntary rules that make up the international investment law and policy regime today 
and move toward a binding Multilateral Framework for Investment that comprehensively 
accommodates the rights and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in a manner that 





Comparing the 1984 and 2004 US Model BITs 
  
 
U.S. Model BIT (1984) U.S. Model BIT (2004) 
Preamble 
 
Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment 
is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for 
investment and maximum effective utilization of 
economic resources, and… 
Preamble 
 
Agreeing that a stable framework for investment will 
maximize effective utilization of economic resources and 
improve living standards… 
 
Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent 
with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, 
and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights; 
 
 
                                                 
169 Brazil has negotiated 14 BITs, but not ratified any of them, including because of difficulties of 
reconciling investor-State disputed-settlement provisions with its constitution. However, the business 





Definition of Investment 
 
Article I 
(b) “Investment” means every kind of investment in the 
territory of one Party owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, 
such as equity, debt, and service and investment 
contracts; and includes: 
(i) tangible and intangible property, 
including rights, such as mortgages, 
liens and pledges; 
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other 
interests in a company or interests in the 
assets thereof; 
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to 
performance having economic value, 
and associated with an investment 
(iv) intellectual and industrial property rights, 
including rights with respect to 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade 
names, industrial designs, trade secrets 
and know-how, and goodwill; and 
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, 
and any licenses and permits persuant 
to law… 
 
(e) “associated activities” include the organization, 
control, operation, maintenance and disposition of 
companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or 
other facilities for the conduct of business; the making, 
performance and enforcement of contracts; the 
acquisition, use, protection and disposition of property 
of all kinds including intellectual and industrial property 
rights; and the borrowing of funds, the purchase and 
issuance of equity shares, and the purchase of foreign 
exchange for imports. 
 




 “investment” means every asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of 
an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an 
investment may take include: 
(a) an enterprise; 
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in 
an enterprise; 
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;1 
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives; 
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, 
concession, revenue-sharing, and 
other similar contracts; 
(f) intellectual property rights; 
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights 
conferred pursuant to domestic law2, 3; 
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable 
property, and related property rights, such as leases, 
mortgages, liens, and pledges. 
 
1 Some forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures and long-
term notes, are more likely to have the characteristics of an 
investment, while other forms of debt, such as claims to 
payment that are immediately due and result from the sale of 
goods or services, are less likely to have such 
characteristics. 
 
2 Whether a particular type of license, authorization, permit, 
or similar instrument (including a concession, to the extent 
that it has the nature of such an instrument) has the 
characteristics of an investment depends on such factors as 
the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has under 
the law of the Party.  Among the licenses, authorizations, 
permits, and similar instruments that do not have the 
characteristics of an investment are those that do not create 
any rights protected under domestic law.  For greater 
certainty, the foregoing is without prejudice to whether any 
asset associated with the license, authorization, permit, or 
similar instrument has the characteristic of an investments. 
 
3 The term “investment” does not include an order or 










1. Each party shall permit and treat investment, and 
activities associated therewith, on a basis no less 
favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investment or associated activities of its own nationals 
or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the most favorable, subject to the 
right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions 
falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the 
Annex to this Treaty.  Each Party agrees to notify the 
other Party before or on the date of entry into force of 
this Treaty of all such laws and regulations of which it is 
aware concerning the sectors or matters listed in the 
Annex.  Moreover, each Party agrees to notify the other 
of any future exception with respect to the sectors or 
matters listed in the Annex, and to limit such exceptions 
to a minimum.  Any future exception by either Party 
shall not apply to investment existing in that sector or 
matter at the time the exception becomes effective.  
The treatment accorded pursuant to any exceptions 
shall not be less favorable than that accorded in like 
situations to investments and associated activities of 
nationals or companies of any third country, except with 
respect to ownership of real property.  Rights to engage 









1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 




1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of the other party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory. 
 




1. Articles 3 [National Treatment], 4 [Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment], 8 [Performance 
Requirements], and 9 [Senior Management and Boards of 
Directors] do not apply to… 
    iii. a local level of government 
 
4.  Articles 3 [National Treatment] and 4 [Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment] do not apply to any 
measure covered by an exception to, or derogation from, the 
obligations under Article 3 or 4 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, as specifically provided in those 
Articles and in Article 5 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
5.  Articles 3 [National Treatment], 4 [Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment], and 9 [Senior 
Management and Boards of Directors] do not apply to: 
(a) government procurement; or 
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Party, including 
government-supported loans, 




2.  Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have 




No ‘umbrella’ clause is included, but breaches of investment 
authorizations and arguments are still subject to investor-
state dispute Settlement under Art 24 (I) (see below). 
 
But note that under definitions (Article I), “investment 
contracts” are limited to some types of written contracts 





Minimum Standard of Treatment 
 
Article II  
2.  Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and 
security and shall in no case be accorded treatment 
less than that required by international law.  Neither 
Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures the management, operation, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, 
or disposal of investments. 
 
 
6. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting 
claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment 
agreements, investment authorizations and properties.   
 
Minimum Standard of Treatment 
 
Article 5 
Minimum Standard of Treatment8 
1.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment 
in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security. 
 
2.  For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the 
customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to covered 
investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” 
and “full protection and security” do 
not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is 
required by that standard, and do not 
create additional substantive rights. The obligation in 
paragraph 1 to provide: 
     (a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation 
not to deny justice in 
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal 
systems of the world; and 
     (b) “full protection and security” requires each Party to 
provide the level of police 
protection required under customary international law. 
 
3.  A determination that there has been a breach of another 
provision of this Treaty, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that 
there has been a breach of this Article. 
 
8 Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] shall be 
interpreted in accordance with Annex A. 
 
Annex A 
Customary International Law 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that 
“customary international law” 
generally and as specifically referenced in Article 5 
[Minimum Standard of Treatment] and 
Annex B [Expropriation] results from a general and 
consistent practice of States that they follow 
from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 5 
[Minimum Standard of Treatment], the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens refers to all customary 
international law principles that protect the economic rights 









1.  Investments shall not be expropriated or 
nationalized either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization (“expropriation”) except for a public 
purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation; and in accordance with due process of 
law and the general principles of treatment provided for 
in Article II (2).  Compensation shall be equivalent to 
the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriatory action was taken 
or became known; include interest at a commercially 
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be paid 
without delay; be fully realizable; and be freely 
transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange 
on the date of expropriation.  
 
Article XI 
1.  With respect to its tax policies, each Party should 
strive to accord fairness and equity in the treatment of 
investment of nationals and companies of the other 
Party.  
 
2.  Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in 
particular Articles VI and VII, shall apply to matters of 
taxation only with respect to the following : 





1.  Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 
[Minimum Standard of 
Treatment](1) through (3). 
2.  The compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall: 
(a) be paid without delay; 
(b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately 
before the expropriation took place (“the date of 
expropriation”); 
(c) not reflect any change in value occurring because the 
intended expropriation had 
become known earlier; and 
(d) be fully realizable and freely transferable. 
3.  If the fair market value is denominated in a freely usable 
currency, the compensation referred 
to in paragraph 1(c) shall be no less than the fair market 
value on the date of expropriation, plus 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that currency, 
accrued from the date of 
expropriation until the date of payment. 
4.  If the fair market value is denominated in a currency that 
is not freely usable, the 
compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) – converted into 
the currency of payment at the 
market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment – 
shall be no less than: 
(a) the fair market value on the date of expropriation, 
converted into a freely usable 
currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that 
date, plus 
(b) interest, at a commercially reasonable rate for that freely 
usable currency, accrued 
from the date of expropriation until the date of payment. 
5.  This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory 
licenses granted in relation to 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement, or to the revocation, 
limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the 
extent that such issuance, revocation, 




2. Article 6 [Expropriation] shall apply to all taxation 
measures, except that a claimant that 
asserts that a taxation measure involves an expropriation 
may submit a claim to arbitration under Section B only if: 
(a) the claimant has first referred to the competent tax 
authorities (footnote omitted) of both Parties in writing the 
issue of whether that taxation measure involves an 
expropriation; and 








Source: José E. Alvarez, “The once and future foreign investment regime,” in Mahnoush 
H. Arsanjani, Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert D. Sloane, and Siegfried Wiessner, eds., Looking 
to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill Martinus Nijhoff, 2010). 
